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WHEN 2 OR 3 COME TOGETHER
TRACEY L. MEARES*
KELSI BROWN CORKRAN**
ABSTRACT
This Article investigates policies that are responsive to crime in
disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods from a community-based
context. The vehicle is an analysis of a community-wide prayer vigil
held in Chicago in May of 1997. The vigil resulted from a collabora-
tion between the Chicago Police Department and hundreds of mostly
African-American churches on Chicago's West Side. Strikingly, the
local police district's commander facilitated the vigil. The Article
explains the sociological and political significance of this collabora-
tion by drawing on the "Chicago School" of urban sociology, and
demonstrating theoretically and empirically the potential for
collaboration, through the integration of key community institutions,
to promote community capacity to resist crime and to complete
residents' other goals and projects.
The Article then addresses constitutional questions. If collabora-
tion between churches and the police, through religious activity,
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enhances the community efficacy of poor minority neighborhoods,
is there any way to reconcile the benefits of such activity with
constitutional concerns about religious establishment? We focus on
the extent to which African-Americans have been able to influence
this jurisprudence through litigation rather than the internal
structure of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. A review of the
litigation reveals the particular nature of African-Americans'
involvement in the development of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, and it demonstrates plainly the extent to which judicial
sanction of church-state interaction has had, and continues to
have, important racial consequences. African Americans, through
representative litigating institutions, have consistently recognized
the disparate impact of church-state partnerships; but the Court
has never acknowledged the nonreligious implications of its
Establishment Clause decisions. As a result, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is disconnected from the realities of disparate impact,
and that is potentially problematic for African-American communi-
ties. Excavation of the realities of disparate impact is critical in
assessing the extent to which modern church-state partnerships
should be allowed, or even blessed, by the State.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article's title quotes biblical text from the Gospel of
Matthew: "For where two or three come together in my name, there
am I with them."' In May of 1997, these words were invoked as a
kind of catchphrase by participants in a set of extraordinary
undertakings between the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and
hundreds of predominantly African-American churches on the
West Side of Chicago (WSC). This collaboration began with a "call
to action" by the local police commander and culminated in a
community-wide prayer vigil in which groups of ten stood on
designated street corners and prayed to end violence in their
neighborhoods. On that day, not just two or three, but hundreds of
West Side church members and police officers came together in
prayer for their community.2
In using this phrase as our title, we mean to do more than
highlight its use by participants in the joint police-church venture
that is the subject of this Article. "When 2 or 3 Come Together" has
sociological, political, and constitutional significance in the context
of church-police collaboration in poor minority communities. As a
sociological matter, the phrase brings to mind the potential for
building a community's capacity to resist crime, and to complete
other goals and projects of residents, through the integration of key
community institutions. Its political significance flows from the
connection between police and church leaders' deployment of this
religious text and a subsequent change in WSC residents' percep-
tions of the legitimacy of local police in particular and local govern-
ment in general. The constitutional significance of the phrase brings
together the sociological and the political: if collaboration between
churches and the police in religious activity enhances the commu-
nity efficacy of poor minority neighborhoods, is there any way to
reconcile the benefits of such activity with constitutional concerns
about religious establishment? In other words, does the success of
such ventures so depend on overt demonstrations of public religios-
1. Matthew 18:20 (New International).
2. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
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ity that the law and norms supporting separation of church and
state are, perhaps hopelessly, transgressed?
Together, these three related themes constitute the central
inquiry of this Article. Our primary project is to investigate policies
that are responsive to crime in a community-based context, namely
that of disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods. Accordingly, Part I
begins by explaining the importance of community perspective in
developing a crime prevention strategy, discussing specifically the
notion of ecological crime policy. It then provides a sociological
framework for understanding the ways in which policy can engender
improved community social structure and norms of community-
based crime resistance and reduction. In Part II, we describe the
methods of collaboration between predominantly African-American
churches in WSC and the Chicago Police Department, and tie that
description to the sociological theory canvassed in Part I. Part II
then offers empirical evidence supporting the theory that the
sociological benefits previously described can be obtained through
church-police collaborations. Part II concludes with an analysis of
the factors that appear to be responsible for bringing the WSC
prayer vigil to fruition.
Part III departs from sociological theory and explores the consti-
tutional issues raised by church-police collaboration. Separation
of church and state is a firmly rooted political value in the United
States, and police-sponsored religious activity may be inconsistent
with constitutional law, or at least constitutional values. Although
we have no ready answer to this problem, we argue that a produc-
tive examination of this issue must consider both the racialized
context in which contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has arisen, and the relationship between African-American
churches and the political efficacy of marginalized African-American
communities. In this vein, Part III explores the extent to which the
interests and needs of African-American communities have affected,
and been affected by, judicial and political decisions regarding
church-state collaboration.
2007] 1319
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I. CRIME AND COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES
Crime as a problem is often conceptualized at the individual level.
A "crime" occurs when one individual victimizes another individual.
Because we typically think about crime in individual terms,
criminal law policy inevitably focuses on fixing the particular
individuals who commit crime as the primary process of crime
reduction. Although a few criminal law policies address group
criminality, such as accomplice liability or the crime of conspiracy,
these laws are still animated by the notion of crime as a problem
of individual offenders. It is, however, possible to approach crime
policy differently. Rather than focus on what particular individuals
do and aggregating up, one can conceive of crime problems from a
community-level, or ecological, perspective. Ecological crime policy,
in contrast to individual-level, offender-based policy, might focus on
nonoffenders and promote third-party efforts to reduce opportunities
for offenders to offend. Even more broadly, rather than focusing on
penalizing lawbreakers, a community-based approach might seek to
motivate entire groups of people, including potential offenders, to
voluntarily abide by the law.
A. Community Social Organization and Collective Efficacy
In thinking about potential ecological crime policies, it is
important to understand what it actually means to adopt a
community-based perspective of crime. Clifford Shaw and Henry
McKay pioneered the study of crime through a community lens.3
Seeking to explain their earlier findings that juvenile delinquency
remained high in certain areas of central cities despite population
turnover, they rejected individualistic explanations of delinquency.4
Instead, they looked to the processes by which law-breaking
3. See generally CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
URBAN AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENCY IN RELATION TO DIFFERENTIAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES (rev. ed. 1969).
4. See id. at 315 ("It is clear from the data included in this volume that there is a direct
relationship between conditions existing in local communities of American cities and
differential rates of delinquents and criminals.... Delinquency-particularly group deliquency,
which consitutes a preponderance of all officially recorded offenses committed by boys and
young men-has its roots in the dynamic life of the community.").
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behavior could be transmitted across generations.5 They maintained
that three structural factors-low economic status, ethnic heteroge-
neity, and residential mobility-led to the disruption of community
social organization that, in turn, accounted for variation in crime
and delinquency rates in a given area.6 Because Shaw and McKay
believed that the capacity of a community to maintain social control
was a function of the structural context of that community, they
looked to the community itself as the explanatory unit. Rather than
try to figure out what motivated individuals to break the law, Shaw
and McKay sought to explain why certain communities experienced
high crime rates over time while others did not. Their methodology
and focus on macro-level explanatory variables was a trailblazing
approach at the time. Many of Shaw and McKay's contemporaries
believed that associations between concentrations of African
Americans and the foreign-born and crime in urban areas were due
to the individual dispositions of group members, including genetic
explanations for offending.' Shaw and McKay's theory explained
why their colleagues were wrong.
Though Shaw and McKay's theory was ignored for quite some
time, in the last fifteen years or so, it has made a comeback.
Contemporary researchers have extended Shaw and McKay's work
by solidifying the notion of community characteristics as distinct
from the aggregated demographic characteristics of individuals who
live in communities.' For example, in several studies researchers
5. See id. at 174, 316-21.
6. Shaw and McKay found a substantial relationship between structural community
factors and deliquency. They found a correlation of .89 between delinquency rates and Chicago
community areas and a proxy measure for poverty-the number of families on relief. Id. at
146-47. They found a correlation of .60 between deliquency and population heterogeneity
(percentage of foreign-born and Negro heads of families). Id. at 152-55. Both of these
correlations are quite strong. See LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, MODERN DATA ANALYSIS: A FIRST
COURSE IN APPLIED STATISTICS 481 tbl. 14.5 (1990) (explaining how to interpret the strength
of correlations).
7. See ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE
DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL 25-27 (1993) (discussing contemporary
scholarly disagreement over Shaw and McKay's findings and alternative explanations for high
crime rates in urban areas).
8. The research is "ecological" rather than "psychological." A "fundamental assumption"
of ecological research is that social systems "exhibit structural properties that can be
examined apart from the personal characteristics of their individual members." BRIAN J.L.
BERRY & JOHN D. KASARDA, CONTEMPORARY URBAN ECOLOGY 13 (1977).
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have demonstrated that violence is associated with poverty and
residential instability in neighborhoods, clarifying that violence is
connected to neighborhood composition and not to the spatial
distribution of individuals with particular demographic characteris-
tics.9 Additionally, researchers have recently made inroads in
defining those characteristics that best enable social control and the
realization of the common values of residents' community social
organization.' ° In describing the continuous nature of community
social organization, theorists have focused on three processes:
(1) the prevalence, strength, and interdependence of social net-
works; (2) the extent of collective supervision by neighborhood
residents and the level of personal responsibility they assume for
addressing neighborhood problems; and (3) neighborhood residents'
rate of participation in voluntary and formal organizations." Their
hypothesis is straightforward: when the processes of community
social organization are prevalent and strong, crime and delinquency
should be less prevalent, and vice versa.
A 1989 study by Robert Sampson and W. Byron Groves 2 very
likely spurred the current revival of Shaw and McKay's work.
Sampson and Groves examined the relationship between three
components of community social organization-levels of teenage
9. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent
Crime in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1995) (describing how race and class
segregation concentrates violent crime in poor, minority neighborhoods); Robert J. Sampson
& Janet L. Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and
Community-Level Risk Factors, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL
INFLUENCES 1, 48-63 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994) (summarizing the
recent work applying social-ecological theory to explanations of the variation of criminal
violence).
10. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 20-21 (1996) (defining social organization as the ability of neighborhood
residents to "maintain effective social control and realize their common goals"); Robert J.
Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-
Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 777-82 (1989) (explaining that "social disorga-
nization refers to the inability of a community structure to realize the common values of its
residents and maintain effective social controls").
11. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 10, at 20 (offering these three characteristics); cf. Robert
J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality,
in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37, 45 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (identifying
these factors in terms of formal and informal structural dimensions of community social
disorganization).
12. Sampson & Groves, supra note 10.
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peer group supervision, prevalence of friendship networks, and
organizational participation-and crime, using the British Crime
Surveys of 1982 and 1984.13 They found that, in 1982, unsupervised
teen peer groups had the largest overall effect on self-reported
personal violence offending rates. 14 In the same year, unsupervised
teen peer groups also had the largest overall effects on both
victimization by mugging and stranger violence.' 5 Local friendship
networks were substantially and negatively related to robbery, and
organizational participation had significant inverse effects on both
robbery and stranger violence. 6 The magnitude of the effect of
formal organization participation on stranger violence and total
crime victimization was not as large as the effect of supervision of
peer groups and friendship networks; but the direction of the effect
clearly supported theoretical predictions."' Perhaps the study's most
important finding was that the community organization factors
tested had a much larger impact on crime than did socioeconomic
status.18 There is every reason to believe that these findings are
extremely robust. Sampson and Groves's work recently was
replicated by Lowenkamp and his colleagues using the 1994 British
Crime Survey. The replication demonstrated the strong mediating
effects of local friendship networks, unsupervised teen peer groups,
and organizational participation on the relationship between
structural characteristics of neighborhoods and crime. 9 Lowenkamp
and his colleagues also found that, after controlling for social
disorganization measures, there was no statistically significant
prediction of victimization, confirming Sampson and Groves's
important result.
20
13. For a description of the data and methodology behind the study, see id. at 774-77.
Note that the analysis in this piece potentially suffers from the problem described above
because it attempts to characterize community-based processes through aggregated
individual-level data rather than through more direct measures of community characteristics.
14. See id. at 792.
15. See id. at 788 tbl.2, 789 tbl.3.
16. See id. at 789 tbl.3.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Francis T. Cullern & Travis C. Pratt, Replicating
Sampson and Groves's Test of Social Disorganization Theory: Revisiting a Criminological
Classic, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 351, 366 (2003).
20. Id. at 361.
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The astute will recognize, however, that the community social
organization processes identified by scholars do not have to be
activated in favor of norms that support law-abiding behavior. They
are simply a kind of infrastructure. For this reason, one of us has
used the metaphor "norm highways" to describe these processes in
other work.21 The metaphor helps to clarify the fact that the social
infrastructure of a community, by itself, can either inhibit or
support crime. Whether infrastructure supports a community's
efforts to resist crime will depend on the kinds of norms that are
transmitted among individuals who live in a neighborhood. Like
autos on an actual highway, norms can travel in any direction on
"roads" of neighborhood social infrastructure. Thus, the "norm
highways" of neighborhoods may facilitate crime as well as prevent
it.
22
It is not enough to point to social processes, for such processes
may simply represent untapped potential to get things done. There
is an important normative aspect of effective communities that must
be considered. Ideally, communities exhibiting strong ties, high
levels of organizational participation, and high levels of teen
supervision also will be committed to activating these resources for
the good of the community.
Researchers in the Project on Human Development in Chicago
Neighborhoods (PHDCN) have developed a concept to capture
normative dimensions of community efforts to resist crime. The
PHDCN researchers coined a term, "collective efficacy," that is
defined as neighborhoods' ability to realize the common goals of
residents and maintain effective social control. 23 They found that
collective efficacy explains a large component of the variation of
21. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391,
395 (2000); Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 669, 676 (1998).
22. Sociologist Mary Pattillo-McCoy has established empirical support for the notion that
tight social networks sometimes support criminal conduct on a community-wide basis. In
researching Groveland, a black middle-class community in Chicago, Pattillo-McCoy found that
dense social ties "positively affect[ed] ... informal and formal supervision of youth.... But ...
Groveland's dense networks similarly allow for organized criminal enterprises." MARY
PA'rILLO-McCoY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE
CLASS 70 (1999).
23. See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and
Violent Crime. A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918-19 (1997).
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violence in Chicago neighborhoods.24 PHDCN researchers controlled
for the effect of prior crime through a statistical technique. 5 They
found, even after controlling for prior homicide, that collective
efficacy remained statistically significant and negatively associated
with homicide.26 This correction is a critical one because in neigh-
borhoods with high crime rates, residents may be unwilling to
engage in acts of social control, and this unwillingness in turn
facilitates criminal activity.27
To measure collective efficacy, PHDCN researchers used particu-
larly innovative methods. Survey respondents were not asked about
their own practices and opinions; instead, they were asked to assess
what happened in their neighborhood. Specifically, researchers
tapped into residents' assessments of neighborhood networks and
practices, as well as their opinions about the extent to which people
in the neighborhood shared the same values and trusted one
another.28 In this way, the researchers identified important
community characteristics, paving the way for true ecological
research.
24. See id. at 918.
25. See id. at 922.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 919-20. PHDCN researchers measured practices of informal social control
through a five-item Likert-type scale:
Residents were asked about the likelihood ... that their neighbors could be
counted on to intervene [when] ... (i) children were skipping school and hanging
out on a street corner, (ii) children were spray-painting graffiti on a local
building, (iii) children were showing disrespect to an adult, (iv) a fight broke out
in front of their house, and (v) the fire station closest to their home was
threatened with budget cuts.
Id.
To measure indicia of neighborhood social cohesion and trust, PHDCN researchers asked
respondents how strongly they agreed that: (i) "people around here are willing to help their
neighbors," (ii) "this is a close-knit neighborhood," (iii) "people in this neighborhood can be
trusted," (iv) "people in this neighborhood generally don't get along with each other," and (v)
"people in this neighborhood do not share the same values." Id. at 920. The last two items
were reverse-coded. Id. The two measures of informal social control and social cohesion were
then combined into one measure-collective efficacy. Id.
2007] 1325
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B. Building Social Capital
In communities that demonstrate the capacity to "get things
done," two dimensions, one structural and the other normative,
work together. The structural dimension is captured by measures
of community social organization, whereas the normative dimension
is captured by measures of collective efficacy. These two dimensions
are species of social capital. James Coleman has described the
concept of social capital: "Social capital ... comes about through
changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action.... Just
as physical capital and human capital facilitate productive activity,
social capital does as well."2 According to Coleman, social capital is
realized through relationships.3 ° In an attempt to clarify the
sometimes expansively defined idea of social capital, Sampson,
Morenoff, and Earls distinguish the structural dimension of social
capital from the normative dimension.31 In their view, community
structural characteristics such as friendship networks and partici-
pation in community organizations are potential resources that a
community might use.32 In contrast, a community-wide norm of
adult supervision of neighborhood children for the purpose of social
control is a positive goal-directed task that "activates" the resource
potential found in friendship networks.33
To see how community structural and normative social capital
dimensions work together, consider the social process dimensions
already discussed. When adults in a community work together to
promote a community-wide expectation that each will supervise the
community's children collectively, increased supervision of youth
peer groups should follow. 34 A community-wide expectation of youth
29. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc.
S95, S100-01 (Supp. 1988) (introducing and defining the concept of social capital, and noting
that "a group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to
accomplish much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness and trust").
30. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 304 (1990).
31. See Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Felton Earls, Beyond Social Capital:
Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 633, 634-36 (1999).
32. See id. at 635.
33. See id.
34. See Coleman, supra note 29, at S102-03 (pointing to mutuality of obligation as an
example of social capital); see also Sampson, Morenoff & Earls, supra note 31, at 647 tbl.5
(presenting a statistical model suggesting that neighborhood residents are more actively
1326 [Vol. 48:1315
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supervision will not be meaningful unless substantial numbers of
the community's adults believe they are obligated to participate.
One can imagine many ways of inculcating such a norm, but an
obvious way to encourage community-wide supervision of children
is to threaten a social sanction for the failure to do so. 35 For such a
threat to be credible, however, there must be connections, or social
networks, among adults in a community that facilitate transmission
of the norm from person to person. Without networks connecting
adults, it is too easy for any one adult in the community to free-ride
on the contributions of his neighbors without fear of sanction. All of
this means that local friendship networks should reinforce the
supervision of teen peer groups, which in turn leads to lower levels
of both victimization and offending.36
Friendship networks might also create another form of social
capital by facilitating information transmission among a commu-
nity's residents.37 Information channels may be especially important
to residents of crime-prone neighborhoods in central cities. As noted
elsewhere, "[u]rbanization is almost synonymous with densely
populated communities, and population density can be a barrier to
social capital formation among city-dwellers."38 The problem for
many city-dwellers is not that they have weaker acquaintance
networks than non-city dwellers; rather, the problem is one of
proportion:
The networks that a city-dweller creates typically have less
potential to include all of the individuals in a community with
which a resident will come in contact. Put simply, high popula-
tion density increases the number of strangers. Friendship
networks... make it easier for residents to identify who "belongs"
and who does not.39
involved in child supervision when others around are similarly involved).
35. See COLEMAN, supra note 30, at 244, 245 fig. 10.1 (explaining the relationship between
the emergence of a norm and sanctions).
36. See, e.g., Sampson & Groves, supra note 10, at 788-89 (demonstrating that supervision
of teen peer groups is associated with lower crime rates).
37. See Coleman, supra note 29, at S104.
38. Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 584 (1997).
39. Id.; see also CLAUDE S. FISCHER, TO DWELL AMONG FRIENDS: PERSONAL NETWORKS IN
TOWN AND CITY 162 (1982) (discussing statistical evidence showing urbanites associate with
approximately the same number of locals as residents of more rural locales, and noting that
2007] 1327
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Participation in formal organizations is another community
structural factor that, theoretically, should reinforce the crime-
reduction benefits of both teenage supervision and friendship
networks. 4° Local formal organizations provide community residents
with important opportunities to create overlapping relationships.
Overlapping relationships subject the residents of a community
to expectations and obligations in multiple contexts, and these
obligations and expectations often are transferable across different
contexts. The existence of multiple, overlapping relationships among
a community's residents has important implications for crime
prevention.4 Friendships among neighbors that are reinforced
through individual participation in church groups, PTAs, commu-
nity policing organizations, and the like are very likely to increase
supervision of teenage peer groups in a community and increase
information transmission.
Recent empirical work refines the relationships between com-
munity social capital and crime reduction. Using PHDCN data,
which measures community characteristics in a more sophisticated
fashion than the British Crime Surveys, Jeff Morenoff, Robert
Sampson, and Stephen Raudenbush demonstrated empirically that
friendship networks, neighborhood organizations, and participation
in voluntary associations appear to reduce violence through the
promotion of collective efficacy. 42 The authors used sophisticated
statistical models to disentangle the independent effects on
homicide of structural dimensions of social capital, such as social
ties, and normative dimensions of social capital, such as collective
this makes urban residents less likely to be tied to any other given member of their locality
than small-town residents).
40. Meares, supra note 38, at 584; see also Pamela Paxton, Is Social Capital Declining in
the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment, 105 AM. J. SOC. 88, 100 (1999) (arguing
that formal membership in voluntary associations often "provides further resources to solve
collective problems and pursue specific goals in a large society").
41. See Coleman, supra note 29, at S108 (explaining the concept of appropriable social
organization); Marvin D. Krohn, The Web of Conformity: A Network Approach to the
Explanation of Delinquent Behavior, 33 SOC. PROBS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S81, S83 (1986) (calling
this process "multiplexity" and explaining that "if a person interacts with the same people in
differing social contexts it is likely that his behavior in one context will be affected by his
behavior in another").
42. See generally Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush,
Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 517 (2001).
[Vol. 48:13151328
WHEN 2 OR 3 COME TOGETHER
efficacy.4" In essence, the authors found that dense networks alone
are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain homicide rates;
instead, networks appear to create the capacity for neighborhood
residents to exert social control." The authors present statistical
models demonstrating that social networks are positively and
significantly associated with collective efficacy.45 Similarly, the
models show that organizations and voluntary associations appear
to operate indirectly on homicide by fostering collective efficacy.46
For neighborhood residents to use their capacity to exert social
control, there must be a willingness on their part to activate this
resource. The willingness to do this depends in large part on
solidarity and mutual trust among neighbors-a trust and solidar-
ity that is undermined by diverse and competing subcultures.
Qualitative, ethnographic research best demonstrates the ways in
which conflicting normative codes can undermine the extent to
which residents of some communities must overcome high barriers
to promote values consistent with law-abiding behavior.
In two ethnographic works, Elijah Anderson compellingly re-
counts how the weakened structural fabric of an urban community
called "Northton" accompanied the transmission of two different
sets of norms among residents of the community.47 Anderson
describes in great detail the clash between "decent" values (norms
associated with hard work, family life, the church, and law-abiding
behavior) held by some families in Northton and "street" values
(norms associated with drug culture, unemployment, little family
responsibility, and crime) held by others.4" A central theme in
Anderson's story of Northton is the gradual breakdown of a
43. See id.
44. Id. at 548-49.
45. See id. at 550 tbl.4.
46. See id.; cf. Ruth D. Peterson, Lauren J. Krivo & Mark A. Harris, Disadvantage and
Neighborhood Violent Crime: Do Local Institutions Matter?, 37 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 31,
48-52 (2000) (finding that recreation centers, but not libraries or retail establishments, have
a crime-reducing impact in extremely disadvantaged areas).
47. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY 56-76 (1990) [hereinafter ANDERSON, STREETWISE] (describing the impact of wider
economic changes on the African-American community in Northton and introducing the
notions of "decent" and "street" orientations); see also ELIJAHANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET:
DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 35-65 (1999) [hereinafter
ANDERSON, CODE] (comparing "decent" families to "street" families).
48. See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 47, at 56-76.
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community tradition involving the transmission of decent values
by neighborhood "old heads" to neighborhood youngsters. 49 This
breakdown accompanied the constriction of employment opportuni-
ties for the young, increased neighborhood transience, and increased
crime.5°
Anderson's ethnography of Northton reflects the predictions of
social organization theory. As social networks in Northton weak-
ened and contracted due to residential instability, unemployment,
and increased drug use, a rival set of streetwise values flourished.51
The streetwise norms that Anderson describes are at once a product
of affirmative reinforcement of lifestyles that focus on drug use and
crime, and a product of the vacuum created by the breakdown of
broad social networks. For example, when work in the formal labor
market is not available for significant numbers of a community's
residents, a value system may arise among the jobless that affirms
the pursuit of economic opportunities outside of the formal labor
market and in the informal labor market, or even in the illegal drug
economy.52 Furthermore, when social networks in a community are
weak and disparate, it becomes more difficult for the community as
a whole to emphasize the importance of seeking work in the formal
labor market.
Anderson's finding, that streetwise values did not completely
overtake decent values in Northton, helps us understand the oper-
ation of collective efficacy in a community. While many in Northton
continued to adhere to decent values, they still had to reckon with
streetwise values in their daily lives because those values predomi-
nated among the community's youth and in public spaces.53 Of
course, any time there are competing value systems in a community,
it is harder to establish a common value set-especially a value
49. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 47, at 204-05; ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note
47, at 69-76.
50. See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 47, at 56-98 (describing the relationship
between economic changes in the Northton community and the attendant vulnerability of the
community to crime-especially drug offenses).
51. See id.
52. See WILSON, supra note 10, at 66-72 (explaining that, in communities in which
joblessness is prevalent, residents may internalize modes of behavior that are inconsistent
with preference for work in the formal labor market, which is characterized by greater
regularity in hours and consistency than informal and illegal labor markets).
53. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 47, at 98-106 (explaining how "decent" kids are
impelled to "code-switch" and adopt "street" personas in public).
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directed toward affirmative collective efforts to resist crime as
opposed to norms that support withdrawal from public life. The
problem is magnified, however, when the competition takes on a
generational-conflict aspect.
For example, promoting a norm of community-wide supervision
of teen peer groups is likely to be more effective when the level of
social capital among adults exceeds that among teens in the
community. If parents cannot count on one another to supervise
each other's children, then individual parents have to counteract the
norms developed by groups of teens-norms that may promote law-
breaking behavior. Unfortunately, when the social capital among
teens is high, which often is true in the communities with street
gangs, individual parents face a dilemma. Each parent alone has
little power to counteract the power of the teen group. Moreover, the
power of the teen group may make the individual parent's task more
intimidating, causing her to exert even less supervisory control than
she otherwise would. This is, of course, a very general description of
some of the mechanisms that underlie the withdrawal of Northton's
"old heads" from community life. 4
In her book, Black Picket Fences, Mary Pattillo-McCoy's descrip-
tion of "Groveland," a black middle-class Chicago community, stands
in stark contrast to Anderson's description of disadvantaged
Northton."5 Pattillo-McCoy provides a rich account of the multiple
ways that Groveland's residents exert social control over youth.
For example, she recounts a local school council meeting in which
one attendee stated, "[w]e have to take responsibility for all of our
children. The same children that are beating up on our children
are also our children. They go right around the corner when they
go home. They are our children."56 This statement captures the
expression of collective efficacy through a particular institutional
process, a school council meeting.
54. For a quantitative demonstration of the dynamics described here, see Sampson,
Morenoff & Earls, supra note 31, at 637 (finding that residents of disadvantaged
neighborhoods have much lower expectations for shared intervention on behalf of children in
public settings, even where the level of personal ties is not affected by concentrated
disadvantage in neighborhoods).
55. See PArrILLo-McCoY, supra note 22.
56. Id. at 78.
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Pattillo-McCoy goes on to describe how participants at community
meetings of block clubs, police beats, church groups, and the
chamber of commerce, among others, devote a great deal of time to
the issue of youth supervision." Gangs and "gang-bangers" are the
top concerns of Groveland residents.58 In an effort to address gang
issues, citizens employ strategies such as removing pay phones from
the street, removing gang graffiti from buildings, hiring police
monitors for playgrounds, and providing activities for at-risk
youth.59 Pattillo-McCoy's description provides real-life examples of
the processes that Sampson and his colleagues describe through
statistics. Yet Pattillo-McCoy also demonstrates how strong social
networks can support "corporatized" gang activity as well. Pattillo-
McCoy explains that Chicago's largest street gang, the "Black
Mobsters," had a strong presence in Groveland and dominated a
Groveland park fieldhouse and other parts of the neighborhood;
60
but she describes how the top "Black Mobster," Lance, is fully
integrated into the community.6 Lance makes sure that Groveland
is clean because of self-interest in protecting his family, and due to
the numerous activities of residents described above.62 Lance is an
agent of social control in the neighborhood, and the residents know
it." Pattillo-McCoy's ethnography demonstrates that, in the midst
of seemingly effective community social organization, those involved
in somewhat serious crime can exist quite peacefully alongside those
who abhor crime.
C. Ecological Crime Policy
This review of the sociological literature affirms that crime is a
community problem that can be usefully addressed from a
community-based perspective. For example, one of us described
57. See id. at 80-82.
58. See id. at 80.
59. See id. at 79-82.
60. See id. at 83, 85; see also Jeffery Fagan, Gangs, Drugs and Neighborhood Change, in
GANGS IN AMERICA 39 (C. Ronald Huffed., 2d ed. 1996) (describing "corporate gangs" as those
gangs with elaborate, cohesive leadership structures that exist to make money and that mimic
business in rules and group dynamics).
61. See PATTILLO-MCCOY, supra note 22, at 85-90.
62. Id. at 86.
63. Id. at 85-90.
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elsewhere methods of designing policing strategies to promote
crime-preventive aspects of community social organization.' Taking
the community-based perspective seriously implies policy directed
at third parties-in addition to offenders-and designed to enhance
the likelihood that a community's crime rates will decrease. Thus,
whereas crime policies such as reverse sting operations or anti-gang
loitering ordinances may be particularly potent mechanisms for
addressing the community-based nature of crime," the theory
outlined above makes clear that the police, or the state more gener-
ally, likely can promote community social organization through
more direct mechanisms-mechanisms that create networks among
individuals in a neighborhood or between key institutions.66 For
example, one of the specific charges of the City of Chicago's CAPS
(Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy) Implementation Office is to
help neighborhood residents start block clubs. The CAPS Office
considers block clubs to be one of the building blocks of successful
community policing in Chicago. The CAPS Office believes that these
groups are effective mechanisms for focusing residents' attention on
area crime problems. But, it is also true that the block club can
function as an institution that brings individuals together who
would not otherwise have an incentive to interact. In this way,
policy that promotes block clubs also promotes opportunities for
networking and establishing norm highways.
The next Part describes the WSC prayer vigil. We argue that the
vigil helped to create a species of social capital in the form of
connections among institutions, as distinct from individuals, that
traditionally were not connected with one another. These connec-
tions, we think, could be activated in support of community efforts
to reduce and resist crime.
II. THE CHICAGO PRAYER VIGILS
In May of 1997, the first community-wide prayer vigil to end
violence against children was held on Chicago's impoverished West
64. See Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 191, 217-27 (1998) (explaining how reverse drug stings and antigang loitering
ordinances potentially could support community social organization).
65. See id. at 220-26.
66. See supra Part I.A.
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Side.67 The structure of the vigil was somewhat unique. Participants
stood in groups of ten on designated corners-the same corners
where lookouts often hawked contraband by calling out "Rocks and
Blows!"-and prayed for peace in the community. 8 Following the
prayer vigil, the group was joined by thousands of other community
residents who went to a large park for a "praise celebration," which
included music from a four-hundred-member gospel choir, food, and
inspirational speeches.69 While the event's size made it unique, the
number of participants in the day-long activities was not its most
remarkable feature. What was most remarkable about the vigil was
that its key instigator was the highest-ranking police officer of the
Harrison District, Commander Claudell Ervin.7"
Commander Ervin's involvement in the West Side prayer vigil
was the product of a vision he had received approximately six
months before the event.71 In the vision, the Commander saw
community residents standing in groups of ten on street corners:
The Lord blessed me in such a mighty way when he gave me
visions of ten people on the corner. I could never understand
why ten people. The word says where two or three are gathered,
I'm in their midst. Why ten? But then on prayer vigil day, I see
why ten. Ten makes a statement on that corner. Two, three
67. The vigil covered an approximately fifteen-square-mile area bordered by North,
Ashland, Cicero, and Austin Avenues. For media accounts of the day's events see Gary Marx,
Cop Believes West Side Has a Prayer: Harrison Commander Uniting Thousands for Vigil
Against Violence, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 1997, at 1; Dave Newbart, Residents Take Faith to Streets
for Vigil: Participants Pray for West Side Peace, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1997, at 1.
68. Detailed information about the first vigil was gleaned through numerous interviews
of participonts and key organizers. The initial interviews with key vigil participants were
conducted on May 22, 1997; June 11, 1997; and June 12, 1997. Following these initial
interviews, a list of potential interviewees was constructed by reviewing sign-in sheets from
the planning and evaluation meeting for the first prayer vigil. Additionally, fliers were
distributed in local churches and interviewees were asked about others who might be
interested in talking about the vigil. Finally, those who agreed to an interview were offered
a small monetary compensation (ten dollars). Fifty-five interviews were conducted between
1997 and 1998. Forty-one of these interviews were with individuals who represented
institutions. All interviews were conducted after promises of confidentiality according to
Human Subject Research Regulations at the University of Chicago, so the interviewees'
names, with the exception of one who granted express permission, will not be revealed in this
Article. The description of the 1997 WSC prayer vigil is taken from these interviews.
69. See supra note 68.
70. Marx, supra note 67.
71. Id.
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people, well, you know, what you all doing? You all really ain't
doing nothing. But ten folks on the corner covers the whole
corner. You got to go around them.
72
To act on the vision, Commander Ervin sent letters to hundreds
of churches in the Harrison Police district, extending an invitation
to church leaders to attend a meeting at the police district head-
quarters.73 That the commander invited church leaders to meet with
him was not particularly noteworthy; community policing in
Chicago was and continues to be premised, at least in part, on
outreach to key neighborhood leaders,74 and churches are central to
disadvantaged African-American communities in Chicago and
elsewhere. Indeed, it is not a stretch to say that churches are the
central institution in these communities. As sociologist Sandra
Barnes has commented, "the historic Black Church has been found
to be an important economic, political, social, and psycho emotional
buffer for African-Americans."75 In light of the key role of churches
in WSC, it made sense for Commander Ervin to seek out church
pastors.76 In fact, interviews with key participants and institutional
representatives revealed that Ervin's immediate predecessor,
Commander Bolling, also had tried outreach to church leaders in
the Harrison District. Bolling's efforts, however, proved unfruitful.
Bolling attempted to involve area church leaders in community
policing by inviting them to attend meetings in large Baptist
churches in the Harrison District. Bolling reasoned that, as the
Baptist denomination was the most prevalent among churches in
the Harrison Police District, he could attract a large number of
ministers by cultivating ties with the leaders of the most established
72. Interview with Claudell Ervin, Commander, Chi. Police (May 22, 1997). Commander
Ervin gave his permission to be identified in any published work associated with the WSC
prayer vigils.
73. Id.
74. See WESLEYG. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE
145-46 (1997) (explaining that churches constituted a "separate analytic focus" given that
churches were key in several of the prototype districts).
75. Sandra L. Barnes, Priestly and Prophetic Influences on Black Church Social Services,
51 Soc. PROBS. 202, 202 (2004).
76. For a multidimensional discussion of the social role played by black churches, see C.
ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (1990). See also infra text accompanying notes 127-33 (charting the close
connection between religion and African Americans).
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churches. However, the only pastors who typically showed up to the
meetings Bolling planned were the pastors of the host churches.
Commander Ervin's strategy to attract local ministers differed
from Commander Bolling's approach. Ervin invited the pastors from
various denominations to attend a meeting at police headquarters
as opposed to church buildings. And, interestingly, he signed the
invitation letter with an Old Testament scripture. In contrast to the
poorly attended meetings convened by Commander Bolling, Ervin's
meetings were well attended by area ministers. It was during these
meetings at the Harrison District Headquarters that the police and
pastors collaborated to plan a prayer vigil.
A. The West Side Vigil as an Example of a State-supported Social
Organization
The church/police collaboration that occurred in several WSC
communities" beginning in 1997 presented such a poignant ex-
ample of a state-supported community social organization endeavor
that it prompted a study. Over two years, multi-faceted data was
collected to assess the impact of two community-wide prayer vigils
facilitated by the police. 8 The goal of the research was to explore
whether the potential benefits of the theories of social organization
77. WSC is comprised of seven local Chicago Community Areas either in whole or in part:
West Garfield Park, East Garfield Park, Austin, Humboldt Park, West Town, Near West Side,
and North Lawndale. According to 2000 Census Data, the Eleventh District accounts for 2.8%
of the total population of Chicago and ranks nineteenth among the twenty-five districts in
terms of population. See RESEARCH & DEV. Div., CHI. POLICE DEP'T, BIENNIAL REPORT
1999/2000, at 11 fig.3c. In 1997 there were sixty-nine murders in the Eleventh District, more
than in any other district. See RESEARCH & DEv. DIv., CHI. POLICE DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT
1997, at 16 fig.6c. The same was true in 1998, 1999, and 2000. See RESEARCH & DEV. DIV.,
CHI. POLICE DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at 10 fig.4c (noting that in 1998, the Eleventh
District had seventy-one murders, 10.1% of the city's total); RESEARCH & DEv. DIv., CHI.
POLICE DEP'T, BIENNIAL REPORT 1999/2000, at 12 fig.4a (noting that in 1999, the Eleventh
District had seventy-nine murders, 12.3% of the city's total); id. at 13 fig.4b (noting that in
2000, the Eleventh District had sixty-seven murders, 10.6% of the city's total).
78. Data was collected through four instruments administered between 1997 and 1999:
(1) Two mail surveys administered in 1997, after the first prayer vigil, and in 1998, after the
second, in an attempt to gauge the level of institutional participation and the impact on
institutional linkages because of the vigils; (2) a survey of the population of police officers in
the Harrison District; (3) a randomized phone survey of 506 respondents from the WSC area;
and, (4) fifty-five open-ended interviews (fourteen individual-level and forty-one institutional-
level) designed to obtain first-person descriptions of WSC, to probe attitudes toward the
community, relevant institutions, and the prayer vigil, and to get a sense of the vigil's impact.
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and collective efficacy discussed in Part I could be realized on the
ground. The study design was constructed keeping in mind that
improved relations between churches and the police can assist
neighborhood residents concerned about crime in three related, yet
structurally different, ways. The first structural path concerns the
vertical relationship between the police and the church. The second
structural path emphasizes improvements that flow from tighter
and more prevalent horizontal relationships among key community
institutions. And the third path involves the individual relation-
ships that neighborhood residents have with one another. This
analysis reflects an application of Albert Hunter's three-level
schema of social control.79
Hunter asserts that community social control occurs at three
levels: private, parochial, and public.' The private level is the most
basic, and is comprised of an individual's family and friends-those
with whom the person is closely connected. Social control is achieved
informally through mechanisms such as support and mutual esteem
at one end, and ridicule, criticism, and even ostracism at the other.81
The next level of social order is the parochial.8 2 Individuals at this
level, while connected, do not have the same sentimental attach-
ments that are found at the private level.8 3 As a result, there is a
much greater likelihood for the formation of important "weak ties"
at the parochial than the private level.' Hunter points to the public
level as the final level of social control. The public level comprises
resources external to the community such as bureaucratic agencies
79. See Albert Hunter, Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of Crime
and Incivility in Urban Communities, in THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CITIZENSHIP
AND INSTITUTION BUILDING IN MODERN SOcIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORRIS JANOWIT 230,
230 (Gerald D. Suttles & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1985).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 232-33.
82. See id. at 233-34.
83. See id.
84. These ties are "weak" because the relationship between two people weakly tied is less
intense than the relationship between close family and friends. Mark Granovetter, who wrote
the classic article on the topic, has shown, however, that such "weak ties" may be critical for
job searchers. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOc. 1360, 1369-
73 (1973); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 319-21 (2000) (emphasizing the economic value of weak ties, which
may be more likely to lead to job opportunities for those whose strongest ties are within
economically disadvantaged communities).
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like the police and other instrumentalities of government."8 The
major difference between this level and the other two is that the
public level of social control relies uniquely on its legitimate
monopoly on coercion and force to produce order. Hunter describes
the criminal justice system as the "ultimate" source of social
control.86
The public level can legitimately use force to produce order;
however, this force alone cannot produce society's desired level of
social control because of resource limitations and other formal
constraints, such as constitutional law.8" Social control at the public
level is produced through formal sanctions-the threat or actual im-
position of coercion; therefore, compliance at this level is produced
through instrumental means. To produce an effect, instrumental
means of producing compliance depend, to a large extent, on an
individual's fear of sanction. 8 If one assumes that people will
comply with a rule only if the threat of coercion is present, then it
follows that instrumental methods of social control are contingent
upon the commitment to increasing the use of force if necessary.
This means that instrumental means of producing compliance can
be costly. 9 For example, if deterrence is achieved by maintaining a
certain probability of detection of rule-breakers, then authorities
must be willing to devote resources to maintain or increase the level
of police to ensure they meet the requisite probability of detection.
In contrast to social control produced at the public level, social
control produced at the private and parochial levels is generated
through informal means and, therefore, is more likely to utilize nor-
mative rather than instrumental methods of compliance.9" Given the
limitations of formal social control, social control often is produced
informally and normatively at the private and parochial levels.9'
Individuals voluntarily conform to others' expectations by internal-
izing community norms.92 In some situations, the compliance
produced through the intermeshing of the personal and parochial
85. See Hunter, supra note 79, at 238.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 238-39.
88. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 56 (1990).
89. See id. at 65.
90. See id. at 23-24.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 24-26.
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levels of social order looks much like compliance produced by the
instrumental means at the public level-sometimes people comply
because they fear informal sanctions imposed externally.93 However,
the individual who complies for normative reasons does so because
she feels an internal obligation to do so. 4
Social networks among friends and neighbors harness personal
knowledge and trust among family, friends, and neighbors to create
internalized expectations of obligation to conform to social norms.9"
Thus, Hunter's schema of private and parochial social orders
complements the theories of social organization and collective
efficacy described in Part I. Whereas those theories help to explain
how neighborhood residents resist crime through informal means
without always resorting to the police and other criminal justice
entities, Hunter's three-level schema explains the relationship
between a community's informal and formal efforts to produce
safety.96
Drawing on Hunter's schema, one can see how improved relations
between the police, at the public level of social control, and
churches, at the parochial level, potentially benefit neighborhoods
plagued by crime. Newly formed connections between churches
and the police in WSC could produce a new species of social capital
to be directed toward violence control. For example, by interacting
with church leaders and parishioners, the police likely would gain
access to new sources of information to assist them in criminal
investigations. Such interactions might make church leaders and
parishioners more willing to identify offenders who victimize them,
which in turn would allow the police to more efficiently locate
offenders.97 If more offenders are located and arrested, then the
certainty of punishment increases and so does the level of formal
deterrence. Church leaders, on the other hand, could parlay a
stronger relationship with the police to gain better access to
municipal government resources.
93. See id. at 24, 59 tbl.5.1.
94. See id. at 24.
95. See supra Part I.B.
96. See generally Hunter, supra note 79.
97. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
IN UNITED STATES, 1999 STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl.103 (indicating that some victims do not
report victimizations to police because they believe police to be uninterested, inefficient, or
biased).
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Perhaps even more interesting than the benefits that flow from
better vertical relationships, between churches and police, is the
way in which those improved relations on the vertical plane can
translate into stronger connections among the churches themselves.
If the prayer vigil led to stronger connections among these key
institutions, Hunter's theory suggests that an improved community
context for social control would obtain.
B. Empirical Evidence Regarding Changing Social Structure in
WSC
1. Before the Vigil
Ideally, linkages between parochial and public levels, represented
in this study by churches and the police, must be prevalent and
strong to promote optimum conditions for effective social control at
the community level. Prior to the 1997 prayer vigil, linkages
between the police and WSC churches were quite weak. Most of the
churches surveyed reported only occasional contact with police.98
Semistructured interviews with church leaders reveal a more
complex story. In addition to being only "occasional," it would
appear that the contact between police and churches in the area
studied could best be characterized as reactive: leaders called police
when they needed them. The responses of a young associate Baptist
minister, the senior pastor of a three-hundred-member church in
East Garfield Park, and the executive director of an interfaith
organization are indicative:
Interviewer: Okay. I want to talk about the police. How would
you characterize your organization's relationship, past relation-
ship, we're talking pre-vigil, with the local police?
Reverend Associate Baptist: They don't bother us. We don't
bother them.
98. In a mail survey of area churches administered shortly after the 1997 Vigil, thirty of
sixty-one respondents characterized their contact with police as "occasional friendly contact."
In another survey administered after the 1998 Vigil, thirty-two of sixty-one respondents noted
that they had "occasional contact" with the police. Eighty-five percent of these respondents
characterized their contact with police as "cooperative." But, importantly, about seventeen
percent of respondents maintained that they had no contact at all with the police.
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Interviewer: How would you characterize your church's
relationship with the police before the prayer vigil?
Pastor of Community Church: We really did not have
one.... And if we needed them we called them.
Interviewer: How would you characterize your church's
relationship with the police before the prayer vigil?
Community Leader: I guess I would characterize it the
same way I characterize a private citizen (inaudible), very
little contact. And that's about it. Very little contact.
At first glance, the reactive nature of the relationship between
WSC churches on the one hand, and police on the other, might not
be particularly remarkable. When one recalls, however, that the
residents of the Harrison Police District faced extraordinary crime
problems,99 it becomes significant that the community's key civil
institution made little effort to work with the primary governmental
entity charged with addressing crime on a more proactive basis. One
might also say that, to the extent that contacts between Harrison
District churches and police created a relationship between the two
key institutions, that relationship was not harnessed in favor of
collective efficacy.
In contrast to the relationship between the churches and the
police, there were more numerous and prevalent linkages among
WSC churches. However, the data reveal two features of inter-
church collaboration which suggest that the full potential, for
directing social organization to solve community problems, was not
fulfilled. First, many of the links were intradenominational. Second,
the social capital in these links was not directed, as a normative
matter, to the problem that the community rated at the top of its
list: crime.
In a mail survey to churches, church leaders were asked to
characterize their level of contact with organizations of (1) the
same religion, (2) the same religion but different denominations,
and (3) organizations of different faiths. The following graph
99. Crime statistics show that WSC has long had the highest concentration of homicide
in the city. In 2002 the homicide rate of 75.5 per 100,000 was three times the city's average.
See Andrew Papachristos, Tracey Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating
Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. tbl. 1 (forthcoming 2007).
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illustrates the relative levels of frequent contact church leaders
claimed to have with these three different groups.100
We argued above that the reactive nature of limited relationships
between WSC churches and the police prevented the groups from
Fig. 1: Contact among church leaders by denomination and faith.
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harnessing their relationship in favor of collective efficacy.' The
data suggest that a parallel problem existed with respect to goals
for which the relationships among WSC churches were harnessed.
Specifically, the data indicate that, prior to the prayer vigils, the
networks among area church leaders were not primarily-or even
secondarily--directed toward everyday problems facing the com-
munity. To the extent that church leaders were working together,
it was rarely for the purpose of addressing chronic community
problems such as crime. For the most part, when area church
leaders met collectively, they did so for the purpose of addressing
traditional church business. For example, one interdenominational
group of African-American WSC ministers met regularly to update
each other on new ministries or to allow new ministers to try out
100. The responses to the church mail survey are not truly representative of the population
of the area. They are, however, more representative of the actual prayer vigil participants.
The data represented in the graph collapses the respondents from two waves of mail surveys.
101. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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sermons. Occasionally the group dealt with civil rights issues, but
they did not organize to deal with an issue of everyday living, such
as crime. In the words of a senior Baptist minister,
[t]he ministers and churches have always been in the forefront
in segregation and many issues. In the past, we have responded
mostly to a crisis. This time, the commander called us together
and said we're going to make a change in the community
because of the problems, not because of one particular thing that
was going on. This time it brought together many, many people
because of wanting to make a change in our every day living....
But this have [sic] seem to held us together because more than
just ministers, the communities, the police department came
together and though we had those type of movements before, not
in this particular way, not this kind of motivation. It brought
together more fellowship even between the churches, not just to
respond to a crisis but communication and moving and being on
the same wave length. °2
Wes Skogan and Susan Harnett, who have completed an in-depth
study of community policing, documented a similar phenomenon. Of
approximately fifty religious organizations that they surveyed,
fewer than ten percent had a crime-prevention mission.'0 3 Moreover,
C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya's survey of black churches
reflects our data. In their survey, of the sixty percent of respondents
who participated in any ongoing projects that required interdenomi-
national cooperation, only two percent (thirty churches) stated that
they cooperated with churches of other denominations on social-
oriented programs such as drug or alcohol abuse, crime, welfare,
or housing.' To put this in perspective, consider Lincoln and
Mamiya's research demonstrating that 7.2 percent of those churches
that engaged in interdenominational activities participated in
interracial cooperation with white churches. 05 It is reasonable to
assume that for the most part the white churches to which survey
respondents referred were located outside the respondent church's
neighborhood. Thus, according to the most extensive survey of black
102. See supra note 68 for information regarding interview methodology.
103. See SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 74, at 145.
104. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 76, at 156 tbl.22.
105. See id.
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church activity to date, it was more likely for black churches to work
with a church from another sect outside of the neighborhood, as
a demonstration of interracial unity, than it was for the black
churches to engage one another across denominational lines on a
problem as important to local parishioners as crime.
2. After the Vigil
To assess the potential social organization benefits, and costs, of
the WSC prayer vigil, both respondents who participated in the vigil
and those who did not were asked questions that tapped into the
two dimensions of social capital: structures and norms.10 6 Because
of a particular interest in assessing Hunter's ideas regarding
parochial level integration,17 institutional leaders were asked
whether they formed new relationships with other institutional
leaders as a result of participation in the vigil. Similarly, we
assessed changes in affect by asking institutional leaders about the
likelihood of harnessing new relationships for cooperative efforts.
With respect to structure, the survey results reveal that about
fifty percent of respondents stated that they have formed between
one and five new relationships as a result of participation in the
vigil. With respect to the affect dimension, church leaders were
asked whether their opinions regarding various community
institutions had changed, and whether they believed that coopera-
tion between the leader's own organization and various types of
community organizations was more or less likely. The following two
charts summarize these data.
106. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Part II.A.
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Fig. 2. Changes in church leaders' opinions following prayer vigil.
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Each of these charts summarizes the newfound potential for
greater social organization in WSC. By and large, after the vigil,
church leaders had more positive views of other key institutions in
WSC than prior to it. Moreover, leaders claimed an increased
likelihood of cooperation among these institutions for the purpose
of getting things done in the community. Additionally, church
leaders stated that they felt better about the community's prospects
after the WSC prayer vigil. Fully eighty-two percent of respondents
believed it was more likely after the prayer vigil that the community
could get organized to help itself. Fifty-eight percent of respondents
felt that, after the vigil, the police were more concerned about the
well-being of the community's children and the community itself.
Even thirty-nine percent of respondents felt that, after the vigil, the
city government would help WSC improve."' 8
It is important to note here that the data summaries above
include both church leaders who participated in the prayer vigil and
those that did not. Almost a third of our respondents did not
participate in the vigil, yet they appear to have been influenced in
a positive direction merely by their awareness of the event. While
eighty percent of vigil participants reported feeling more positive
about the police after the vigil, fifty percent of nonparticipants
claimed the same. Not one of the nonparticipants reported feeling
more negative about the police after the prayer vigil. Similarly,
while vigil participants were more likely to register intense feelings
about the likelihood of future cooperation with important commu-
nity institutions, nonparticipants still registered positive feelings
about the likelihood of future cooperation. 109 This finding is quite
striking and suggests that the WSC prayer vigil had an impact on
the community that extended beyond the particular participating
individuals.
108. Note, however, that in answer to this question, 46.3% of respondents felt that it was
no more true after the vigil that the city government would be helpful.
109. For example, fifty percent of participants claimed that interdenominational
cooperation was much more likely in the future compared to only ten percent of non-
participants, but majorities of both groups were positive about the likelihood of future
cooperation-seventy-seven percent of participants and fifty-three percent of nonparticipants
respectively.
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The in-depth interviews help to motivate these findings-
especially in terms of individual expectations about the community's
prospects. A Catholic priest summarized his feelings this way:
I think the prayer vigil, number one, is a challenge to every
individual church, organization or whatever: What are you
doing? Are you doing anything? It's time to get busy. It's time to
do some things.11°
Creating expectations for action is a critical component of collective
efficacy.111 The fact that WSC institutional leaders were better
connected after the vigil provides the structural predicate to
reinforce this expectation, just as Hunter would predict." 2
The data is inadequate to allow a complete assessment of the
extent to which these new linkages, along with rejuvenated enthu-
siasm for community control, have translated into concrete projects;
but telling anecdotes abound. For example, researchers attended
meetings of the interdenominational Minister's Alliance that was
formed to promote prayer vigils subsequent to the 1997 WSC prayer
vigil. It was not uncommon to see secular service providers using
Alliance meetings to promote their services, and post-WSC prayer
vigil meetings featured social service purveyors. At one meeting an
organization encouraged pastors to sign up children to receive free
school supplies; at another, representatives of the CPD asked
ministers if they would help to recruit new police officers from their
congregations. The ministers again functioned as certification
intermediaries, but this time the certification was for the primary
benefit of the police instead of for the benefit of congregants.
Other meetings focused on crime policy. One meeting was devoted
to the level of support that ministers would offer to the City's
original antigang loitering law. Another meeting was devoted to
proposed legislation known as "SODA orders," or stay out of drug
area orders, which were designed to exclude individuals who had
been convicted of selling drugs from WSC neighborhoods, provided
that the individual did not live or work in the designated neighbor-
hood. These examples clearly indicate the extent to which an
110. See supra note 68 for information regarding our interview methodology.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
112. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
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improved vertical relationship between the police, representing the
public level of social control, and the church leaders, representing
the parochial level of social control, led to an increase of social
capital for residents of WSC.
We noted above that Hunter's three-level schema predicts that
higher levels of integration between the public and parochial levels
could provide WSC church leaders with the opportunity to gain
more access to municipal government resources.113 That state of
affairs appears to have taken place in WSC postprayer vigil. Less
obvious, however, was that the newly formed relationship between
WSC ministers and the local police would provide the ministers with
increased political efficacy. After the prayer vigil, one key minister
was appointed to serve on the City's Police Board-the first minister
to hold such a position.'14 Another young pastor was appointed to
a high-level position in city government related to community
policing."5 Perhaps most interesting is evidence that the postprayer
vigil relationship between WSC church leaders and the police
enabled church leaders with power to better hold the CPD account-
able to the community's interests. Consider the following telling
case.
Several months after the May 1997 prayer vigil, one young
minister from the East Garfield Park neighborhood encountered two
CPD officers arresting a neighborhood man. The man did not attend
the young minister's church; nonetheless, the minister decided to
find out what was going on. The CPD officers asked the minister to
step away from the arrest scene, which was unfolding peacefully,
but the minister refused. The circumstances that followed were
contested, but the conclusion of the events was clear-the minister
was arrested.
As the minister was processed at the Harrison District headquar-
ters, Commander Ervin saw him and recognized him on his way out
of the building. No doubt because of the newly formed relationship
with area ministers, Commander Ervin asked a lieutenant, the
highest ranking officer in the building, to see to the minister's needs
113. See supra Part II.A.
114. Rev. Johnny L. Miller, pastor of the seven-hundred-member Mount Vernon Baptist
Church was appointed to Chicago's Police Board in 1998.
115. Rev. Vance T. Henry was appointed CAPS Implementation Director on September
10, 2000.
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in the Commander's absence. When Commander Ervin returned to
headquarters to speak to the minister himself, he learned that the
minister had already invoked his right to remain silent and to speak
to a lawyer, so Commander Ervin was not allowed to talk to the
young man. That evening, several of the ministers from the Alliance
held a press conference complaining about racial profiling in WSC.
Other ministers met in a group with the Commander to settle the
dispute. After several meetings, the dispute was resolved.
What is interesting about this incident is Commander Ervin's
demonstrated urgency to solve the dispute. After the WSC prayer
vigil, the Commander's relationship with the ministers was an
important source of his legitimacy in the community. Commander
Ervin depended on the ministers' favor to develop the community's
trust in him. While the pastors' relationship with the Commander
and the CPD was not critical to their position as leaders in the
community, the relationship certainly enhanced their position in
the community as heads of central institutions. Many of the
ministers who participated in the WSC prayer vigil believed that
their relationship with Commander Ervin enabled them to procure
resources for the community, from the CPD and from the City, that
they had not been able, or had not been as able, to procure prior to
the establishment of a stronger vertical relationship between WSC
churches and the police.
In a sense, this crisis enhanced the benefits of the relationship
from the ministers' perspective. Although the ministers were
motivated in part to protect the honor of one of their own, the
incident allowed the ministers to demonstrate to the community,
and to the police, that collaboration with the police would not
inevitably lead to their being co-opted by the police. The police
learned an important lesson as well. They learned that the social
capital in their relationship with the ministers had to be tended and
guarded. In other words, they learned the potential cost of being an
agent of the community rather than vice versa.
It is not a stretch to say the WSC prayer vigil was a key event
that motivated critical rethinking of community policing in Chicago.
After the vigil, the City became much more interested in fostering
local grassroots events for the benefit of community policing.
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Moreover, churches and faith-based institutions have become an
even more prominent feature of Chicago's CAPS strategy. In
September of 2004, the City of Chicago and the CPD sponsored a
huge gathering of faith-based leaders; it was a day of workshops
devoted to community economic empowerment, offender reentry,
grant writing, HIV and public health, responding to the hip-hop
generation, and public policy reform.
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3. Implementing the WSC Prayer Vigil
This Article has presented a picture of the linkages among WSC
churches, and between the churches and the police, both before and
after the landmark 1997 community prayer vigil.116 The data
strongly suggests that important linkages have been formed
between key community institutions, linkages that did not exist
prior to the vigil. We turn now to a critical question: how did this
happen?
As a first pass at answering this question, it is useful to pose a
different query: what were the structural barriers to cooperation
among the churches themselves? The answer to this question
became clear after only a small number of interviews with church
leaders. The governance structure of the predominantly Protestant
local churches in WSC, while facilitating democratic participation
by members, created collective-action problems for coordination
among the leadership of individual churches.
One hurdle to coordination among WSC churches was their wide
diversity of denominations and faith traditions. Survey respondents
were a mix of church leaders from fifteen different Protestant
denominations, including Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, A.M. E.,
Christian Disciples of Christ, Baptist, Church of Christ, Church of
God in Christ, Christian Reformed, Non-Denominational, and
Independent. To refer to these many denominations as simply
"Protestant" belies the variation among them in terms of faith
practice norms, liturgy, and training of the pastors themselves.
Once we add to this mix survey respondents representing the
Catholic Church and the Seventh-Day Adventists, few would be
surprised to learn that many respondents' answers demonstrated
distrust among ministers of various denominations and religious
practices. Tellingly, one Protestant minister responded that he had
had contact with church leaders of a different faith-Catholic
priests.1
17
116. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
117. The historical antagonism between Catholics and some Protestants, especially
evangelical Protestants, has a long history in the United States. See, e.g., ROBERT WUTHNOW,
THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II 72- 76
(1988). The interviewer (Meares) did not get the sense that the Protestant minister being
interviewed held animus against Catholics; rather, he just had not worked with many
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Denominational cleavages in WSC are supported by demographic
differences between sects. There is, of course, a great deal of demo-
graphic variation among congregations within denominations, but
it is also true that denominations are known to have distinctly
different demographic characteristics. For example, in their land-
mark study of black churches, Lincoln and Mamiya found that
black Methodists traditionally tend to come from the middle-
income bracket, while the majority of Pentecostal Church of God in
Christ (COGIC) members are working class or working poor.11
Baptist churches represent the largest chunk of churched African
Americans and reflect a diversity of social classes, 19 whereas a 1993
study of African-American Catholics indicates that they have
higher median incomes than individuals with any other typical
African-American religious affiliation-exceeding the median
income of Baptists by almost $4000.12° These income differences
likely accompany variation in educational attainment, occupational
achievement, and the like among members of the various sects.
Church organization leaders often serve different, but overlapping,
parts of the WSC community. They therefore are located in various
social networks and operate within different spheres of influence.
All these factors present barriers to communication among church
members and church leaders. Yet the same factors portend a great
yield, in terms of social capital, should the church leaders manage
to overcome barriers. Obvious benefits of increased contact among
individuals from different denominations include an increase in
access by the more disadvantaged individuals to jobs, opportunities,
and life expectations.2'
A second hurdle to coordination among WSC churches was
individual, as opposed to institutional, in nature. WSC churches, by
and large, are denominations in which the minister serves at the
Catholics.
118. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 76, at 172.
119. See id.
120. See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 256, 265 (1993).
121. Cf. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1987) (explaining that concentrated disadvantage
results in social isolation, or "the lack of contact or of sustained interaction with individuals
and institutions that represent mainstream society").
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pleasure of his congregation.122 As such, the pastors of these
churches must attract congregants for support. Interviews with
church leaders revealed that simple competition among WSC
ministers, for congregants who could contribute to the collection
plate, played a large role in keeping the ministers from working
with one another.
Commander Ervin was identified in interview after interview as
the individual who could address the various barriers to communi-
cation among WSC church leaders. A Methodist minister had this
to say:
Interviewer: Do you think that all of the churches would have
got together and had an event like the prayer vigil if the police
had not been involved?
Methodist Minister: It would have taken a leader of someone to
bring them together and I don't see anyone in the West Side
area that could have gotten all of the churches involved as they
did.
Interviewer: Why? Why is that? When you say you don't
see-Methodist Minister: Because of denominational barriers.
Seventh Day Adventist would not have come out if I had started
it. The Baptist would not have come out if the Seventh Day
Adventist had started it. The Catholics would not have come out
if the Baptist had started it. So it took an outside interest that
could draw all of them together.
A Baptist minister agreed:
Baptist minister: ... I'm involved in another project where we are
actually trying to pull together the leadership from the seven
major black denominations. And we've been at this thing several
months, and it's not happening. It is not happening at all. And
122. Lincoln and Mamiya document that in 1989, 38,800 churches were organized under
the National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc., the National Baptist Convention of America,
or the Progressive National Baptist Convention. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 76, at 31,
35, 37. This number represents sixty-four percent of the churches of traditionally African-
American denominations. African-American Methodist (AME) and Pentecostal denominations
make up the remainder. See id. at 54, 58, 64, 84 (documenting the number of churches in
three AME denominations and the number in the COGIC denomination). Lincoln and Mamiya
note that Baptist pastors are not appointed to a church by a higher ecclesiastical authority.
Id. at 42. Churches belonging to the COGIC denomination, while not as freestanding as
Baptist churches, tend to exercise considerable autonomy. Id. at 85-88.
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it's always scheduling, scheduling. No, you know. Sometimes
persons may be more inclined to participate in something that
is called together by a body other than a denomination, you
know. Yeah. Probably participation of ministers would not have
occurred on the scale that it did had it been had I called or
something like that.
A community development corporation (CDC) officer commented on
the same point:
Interviewer: Do you think that, you know, assuming that a
church had the resources to do it, do you think that they could
have pulled it off?
CDC Officer: No.
Interviewer: Why not?
CDC Officer: Because like any other groups of people in the
world there are factions. There are the Baptists, there are the
Catholics, there are the Lutheran, there are the Protestant,
there are the everybody. And each group has a central figure
that they look up to. For instance, there's a contingent of pastors
who look up to Reverend (inaudible) because he has been there
for years and he knows and he has the wisdom, and so they
follow him. Younger pastors (inaudible), they follow him.
Reverend X over on President Street, he's another very powerful
minister. He has a contingent of pastors who follow him and
adore him and look to him for wisdom. You would have had to
bring all of those factions together. Now, those are power bases
with those ministers. And this minister does not get along with
that minister, and that minister doesn't get along with that
minister, and this faction is not cooperating because this
minister says no. So I think the commander as the central point
of power in many ways was able to bring the factions together.
That's where he came in. He went to this pastor who had this
group and said, listen, we really need to pray, we need to bring
everybody together and we need to, you know, do this on one
accord, and I want to work with you and I want to work with
Reverend (inaudible), I want to work with this one, I want to
work with that one. And (inaudible) that came together. 123
123. See supra note 68 for information regarding our interview methodology.
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Note, however, that in promoting the WSC prayer vigil, Commander
Ervin had to overcome more than the significant communication
barriers among the participating churches. He also had to overcome
WSC residents' skepticism of police, born of the traditionally
antagonistic relationship between the churches and the police in
Chicago's African-American neighborhoods. Highlighting these two
hurdles suggests that a simple request, by a high-ranking local
police leader, of the churches to work together, would be inadequate
to motivate the churches to work with the police or with each other.
There is additional evidence to buttress this conclusion. As noted
earlier, Commander Ervin's predecessor, Commander Bolling,
reached out to WSC church leaders with little success.'24 However,
Commander Bolling's approach did not work. Why not?
The answer is that it took a combination of individual religious
outreach from a position of organizational neutrality. To achieve
higher levels of collaboration between the police and church leaders,
it was necessary for Commander Ervin to meet the pastors on their
terms. Not surprisingly, operating on the ministers' terms meant
speaking from a religious standpoint. In twenty-six of the forty
institutional-level interviews, respondents emphasized the com-
mander's religiosity. His spirituality was important to vigil
participants-they repeatedly drew attention to it as they explained
why his efforts met with success.
Highly churched125 WSC residents were attracted to Commander
Ervin's spirituality. Respondents tended to discuss the commander's
spirituality in two ways, though several cited both as important. In
the first category were those who described the commander as a
deeply religious man whose spirituality was a force to be reckoned
with. The second category of respondents referred to the commander
as a Christian or as churched-descriptions which mean largely
the same thing in WSC. These individuals suggested that the
124. See supra pp. 1335-36.
125. Our randomized phone survey shows that seventy-five percent of WSC residents
reported attending church. Approximately fifty percent reported attending church weekly, and
ninety percent reported attending at least once a month. But see C. Kirk Hadaway, Penny
Long Marler & Mark Chaves, What the Polls Don't Show: A Closer Look at U.S. Church
Attendance, 58 AM. Soc. REv. 741, 742, 744-46 (1993) (demonstrating that church attendance
rates for Protestants and Catholics are, in fact, approximately one-half of generally accepted
levels).
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commander's success was at least partially the result of his religious
affiliation.
Both of these aspects of religiosity were important to gain the
trust of WSC ministers. The effectiveness of the commander's
strategy can be seen in the interview responses. The young associate
Baptist minister referred to above suggested that the commander's
religiosity helped overcome the objections of those who distrust the
police:
First, they didn't want to be a part of it because it was a police
commander. It was the police, to long it up, it was the police. But
then after seeing he was truly a man of God-proved himself for
the most part-then they came on board and got involved in it,
and word of mouth went around and other people started coming
out.
Another WSC community leader put it this way: "I don't believe it
was really organized by the police. I believe it was organized by a
Christian who happened to be a policeman. And that's a world of
difference." '126
To understand the appeal of Commander Ervin's persona as a
man of faith to the many religious leaders interviewed during this
study, a deeper understanding of the central role of the churches to
many African-American residents is helpful. Domestic and transna-
tional polls have long supported the fact that "American blacks are,
by some measures, the most religious people in the world."12
Compared to white Americans, African Americans "attend church
more frequently, participate in other church-related affairs more
often, and belong to more church-affiliated organizations.""12 Our
randomized telephone survey of WSC residents is in accord with
this research. Eighty percent of the African-American respondents
mentioned attending church at least once a month-the model
response was weekly--compared to forty-three percent of white
126. See supra note 68 for information regarding our interview methodology.
127. GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE
90'S, at 122 (1989).
128. Christopher G. Ellison & Darren E. Sherkat, The "Semi-involuntary Institution"
Revisited: Regional Variations in Church Participation Among Black Americans, 73 SOC.
FORCES 1415, 1415 (1995).
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respondents.129 In addition to registering a connection with church
institutions, African-Americans are more likely than other
groups to say that God is important in their lives. 3 ° Even African
Americans who are not current church members, or who do not
regularly attend church, report praying daily in high numbers.' 3 '
Given this background, the special resonance that religious
references and church culture have for many African Americans,
WSC residents included, is not very surprising. Church culture
provides a blueprint for neighborhood activities, regardless of
whether they are explicitly religious in nature. Familiar music and
hymns, catchphrases of encouragement ("Amen!" "Say it, brother!"),
a preacher-like tone and delivery of a message, and commonly used
scriptural references, are not, for many African Americans, shib-
boleths of their faith; rather, they are parts of a cultural toolkit to
which broad and diverse community groups have access. Mary
Pattillo-McCoy sums up the importance of Church culture for
African-Americans:
The power of prayer, Christian imagery, and call-and-response
interaction lies not only in the possibility of realizing concrete
Church Attendees by Race and Gender (Percentage)
0.8-
0.6
0.4 . . . ..i
0.2
0
BlaclUAffcan-Amedcan Whte/ Caucaean Males Blac&AfscanAmencan a Caucasian Fen'les
Males (6&1101) (15/42) Females (198216) (1938)
129. The above chart provides more texture and detail regarding WSC church attendance.
This chart does not include those who identified themselves as Hispanic, Mexican, Asian, or
as belonging to some other ethnic group.
130. See GEORGE H. GALLuP, JR., RELIGION IN AMERICA 1996, at 52, 53 (1996).
131. See Robert Joseph Taylor, Correlates of Religious Non-involvement Among Black
Americans, 30 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 126, 132 (1988). Only eighteen percent of those African
Americans surveyed who never attend church, or who have no church affiliation, report never
praying at all. Id.
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results from particular supplications, but also in the cultural
familiarity of these tools among African-Americans as media for
interacting, conducting a meeting, holding a rally, or getting out
the vote. Black church culture constitutes a common language
that motivates social action.'32
In her work, Pattillo-McCoy recounts numerous incidents in which
participants of secular meetings probably unthinkingly incorporated
religious activities and references simply because that was the way
to do things.133
In Commander Ervin's case, however, it was not business as
usual. For Ervin, the decision to choose from among the church
cultural menu as opposed to the police secular one was deliberate
and meaningful.' His audience understood his decision in that way
and took it to heart.'35 As a CDC officer astutely recognized, Ervin
did not shed his identity as a police officer by adopting church
culture as a strategy of action to bring churches closer to the police.
This officer downplayed the fact that the commander was
"churched" and emphasized that the commander was a man of faith
who also wielded power as a civic servant:
CDC officer: Well, he is involved in a church, but his central
point of power was the fact he's a spiritual man. And he is a
police commander, okay. Now, if it had been Police Officer Ava
Columbus'36 it wouldn't have worked even still because they
would not have looked to her for leadership. They would not
have come together voice. They came together because he's the
commander of this district, and he employs 350 police officers
(inaudible) at will. And that's his power.
Interviewer: Okay.
CDC officer: So [community leaders] would respect that.'37
So far, emphasis has been placed on Commander Ervin's role in
bringing the many (mostly African-American) churches into a closer
132. Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Church Culture as a Strategy ofAction in the Black Community,
63 AM. SOC. REV. 767, 768 (1998).
133. Id. at 767.
134. See supra pp. 1335-36.
135. See supra p. 1336.
136. A pseudonym.
137. See supra note 68 for information regarding interview methodology.
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relationship with the CPD. However, it is necessary to emphasize
that he was also critical to facilitating the creation of more linkages
among the churches themselves. In light of Hunter's theory of social
control, 8' this aspect of the prayer vigil may have been its most
important result-especially given that it was spectacularly
interdenominational. Interestingly, while it would appear that the
commander's access to church culture was probably the most
important factor that motivated individual church leaders to come
to the table with him as a police officer, it was the commander's blue
uniform and stripes-his role as a police officer and agent of the
state-that helped him to bring the interdenominational groups to
sit down with each other.
As an agent of the state, Commander Ervin was able to take on
an official position of neutrality that most of the participants
recognized. In his role as a public official, he was able to serve as a
mediator among the members of the interdenominational group so
that all of the church leaders could sit down together at the table.
Commander Ervin's persona as a state actor offered a different
benefit of neutrality. He was able to bring the pastors together not
only because he did not represent any particular denomination, but
also because he was not a pastor himself. This was critical in a
world in which church leaders are in competition with one another
for congregants.'39 As a police officer with no church congregation of
his own, Commander Ervin presented little threat to WSC ministers
despite the fact that he organized a high-profile religious event.
Without his own church, Commander Ervin was unlikely to draw
congregants away from any of the WSC ministers' churches-a
practice referred to as "sheep-stealing." Illustrative are the com-
ments of three pastors: an elderly Baptist minister of a storefront
church, the pastor of a nondenominational and interracial church,
and a Catholic regional officer of a national interdenominational
religious organization:
Elderly minister: Well, it looks like most of your ministers that
he want to do something himself instead of being, you know,
unified. You know, together we stand and divided we fall....
[L]ook, sometime it's jealousy, you know. Some of them want to
138. For a discussion of Hunter's three-level schema, see supra Part II.A.
139. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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be their own churches and then when he get a little ahead, then
he won't help the guy that, you know.
Interviewer: Well actually-let me ask you this. Do you think
that the churches could have come up with this idea? That this
would have-if Commander Ervin hadn't been there that the
vigil would have -
Reverend Nondenominational: No. No. I don't think so. And
that's because I think, because I think the churches mirror sort
of the larger society and then there's all kinds of competition
among us, distrust among churches, and it's real petty stuff. I
mean I (inaudible) membership kind of stuff, and so in this sense
you needed somebody outside the neighborhood.
Interviewer: But you were saying, and let me just make sure I
understand this, that [a particular minister] could have the
vision or maybe he has the right attitude, but it sounds as if-
Religious Organization Leader: There would be competition.
There would be ego problems.
Interviewer: But people don't perceive the commander to be in
competition with them?
Religious Organization Leader: No. He's not a pastor of a
church. 4 °
Given these dynamics, it should now be clear why Commander
Ervin was successful in making connections to churches and
subsequently creating a cohesive interdenominational group, while
his predecessor, Commander Douglas Bolling, was not. Commander
Ervin deployed religious language to invite the ministers to work
with him, but he conducted meetings at the police headquar-
ters-neutral state turf. Commander Bolling, in contrast, invited
the ministers to the table with the neutral language of the state, but
held meetings at particular churches-typically Baptist. It is not
surprising that he failed.
While the effect of the commander's religiosity and his role as a
police officer served distinct roles in organizing the prayer vigil, in
reality these two facets worked together to reinforce one another.
For example, the strategy was not effective simply because the
commander used religious language to invite the ministers to come
140. See supra note 68 for information regarding our interview methodology.
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together. It was the fact that a police officer was using religious
language that intrigued the ministers and made them come out. 4'
In the ministers' experience police officers did not use religious
language in their official capacity, and they certainly did not
propose prayer vigils on corners.'42 The ministers also likely had
their own folklore regarding constitutional constraints on state
actors, which contributed to the power of the commander's invita-
tion. 14 3 In short, the ministers' understanding of the commander's
role in the WSC prayer vigil was that he was doing something that
he was not supposed to do. As such, his audience interpreted his
actions as costly to him, and because his actions were so interpreted,
the ministers did not doubt his sincerity. By engaging in conduct
that could subject him to stringent criticism by his superiors, the
commander was able to signal to the ministers that he was trust-
worthy."4 The commander's signal, in turn, enabled the ministers
to confer legitimacy on him, and by extension on the CPD-at least
to a certain extent. In effect, the ministers acted as certification
intermediaries. They "vouched" for the police leader, who formerly
held a position of distrust.
141. See supra text accompanying note 123.
142. See supra pp. 1355-56.
143. This point did not come out directly in any of the ministers' interviews. In fact, only
individuals affiliated with the police or municipal government even mentioned the
constitution or related concerns. Elsewhere, it has been suggested that even those line officers
who supported the WSC prayer vigil and believed it to be consistent with ideas of community
policing might still believe that police officers should participate in prayer vigil activities only
on their "own time" because of some sense of internalized, yet unarticulated constitutional
norms. See Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1626-29
(2002). Similarly, WSC ministers likely have a body of assumptions about the law, or "legal
consciousness," that informs their ability to assess the credibility of government actors such
as Commander Ervin. See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness:
Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 1055, 1059 (2000) (explaining that legal consciousness refers as much to how
people do not think or speak about the law as it does to what they do think and speak about
it).
144. See Emic A. POSNER, LAw AND SocIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000) (explaining a model of
cooperation and the production of social norms whereby individuals signal to one another by
engaging in costly behavior to prove credibly that they are "good" rather than "bad" types).
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III. A HISTORY OF CHURCH AND STATE IN BLACK COMMUNITIES
The data reviewed in Part II suggests that, unlikely as it might
seem at first glance, activities such as the WSC prayer vigil can
contribute to a community context that promotes opportunities for
community residents to work together to achieve higher levels of
safety, and general efficacy, in their neighborhoods. 4 ' Because of
these features, the WSC prayer vigil could be characterized as a
particularly innovative example of community policing. It is also
undeniably true that the collaboration between the CPD and
WSC ministers described here implicates the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution-specifically the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause.'46
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any "law
respecting an establishment of religion."'47 In the landmark case,
Everson v. Board of Education,14 the Supreme Court offered a
resounding interpretation of this language, declaring that the First
Amendment requires "a wall of separation between church and
State" 49 that "must be kept high and impregnable."'50 More
specifically, the majority asserted, public funds cannot be used "to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.""'
In the sixty years since Everson, the Court has decided more than
fifty cases under the Establishment Clause." 2 To assert that this
long line of cases has been the subject of criticism is an understate-
ment. Although there have been many attempts to identify an
internal logic in the Court's line of reasoning, judges and legal
scholars have been able to glean only general principles that are
145. See supra Figures 1 & 2.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment also prohibits laws that interfere with
the free exercise of religion, but this portion of the clause is for the most part not relevant to
the purposes of this Article.
147. Id.
148. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
149. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
150. Id. at 18.
151. Id. at 16.
152. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 287 (2001).
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difficult to apply in all but the most extreme cases of government
support to religion.'53 Our goal here is not to puzzle through the
internal structure of the Court's opinions to assess the relevance of
the Establishment Clause to the WSC prayer vigil. We will instead
focus on the extent to which African Americans have been able to
influence Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the ways that
that jurisprudence has influenced them. A review of the litigation
reveals the particular nature of African-Americans' involvement in
the development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and it
demonstrates plainly the extent to which judicial sanction of church-
state interaction has had, and continues to have, important racial
consequences.
African Americans, through representative litigating institutions,
have consistently recognized the disparate impact of church-state
partnerships, but the Court has never acknowledged the non-
religious implications of its Establishment Clause decisions. As a
result, there is a disconnect between Establishment Clause juris-
prudence and the realities of disparate impact that is potentially
problematic for African-American communities. Excavation of the
realities of disparate impact is critical in assessing the extent to
which modern church-state partnerships should be allowed, or even
blessed, by the state. To that end, we begin with a quick tour of
Establishment Clause cases relevant to the welfare of African-
Americans-cases involving schools and cases involving social
service delivery.
A. Government Aid to Religious Schools
Everson v. Board of Education is a landmark case not only
because it marks the beginning of modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, but also because it is the first Supreme Court
decision regarding public aid to religious schools. At the time of the
decision, the vast majority of private religious schools were
Catholic.5 4 Many scholars have argued that Everson, and the school
153. For examples of this, see generally Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious
Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND.
L.J. 1 (2000); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002).
154. Jeffries, Jr. & Ryan, supra note 152, at 314-18.
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aid cases that followed over the next thirty years, were fueled to a
large extent by anti-Catholic sentiment. 55 For the Protestant
majority and a growing number of liberal intellectuals, the Catholic
Church represented "an authoritarian force that threatened
reasoned inquiry, democratic politics, and social unity."1"
In the African-American community, parochial school aid was
significant not as an issue of church-state relations or anti-Catholic
bigotry, but because of its implications for school desegregation. The
Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education""7 met with
massive resistance, and many southern states prepared to avoid
desegregation by closing public schools altogether and using state
vouchers to fund all-white private schools.15 s Although the Court
soon made it clear that closing public schools was not an option, the
number of private, segregationist academies increased dramatically
in the 1960s.'59 In particular, the Court's rejection of freedom-of-
choice and its endorsement of busing"6 "triggered a massive exodus
of whites from public schools and a scramble to find private alterna-
tives."' 1 Many of these new schools were Christian academies,
established by white churches.'62 The leaders of these churches were
explicit about their motives. One Baptist pastor stated frankly that
he "would never have dreamed of starting a school, hadn't it been
for busing."'63 Another acknowledged that parents enrolled their
children in Christian schools "because they just don't like blacks."'64
155. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001); Jeffries, Jr. & Ryan, supra note 152, at 314-18.
156. Berg, supra note 155, at 124.
157. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
158. Indeed, officials implemented this strategy in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Soon
after, the Supreme Court ruled that the scheme was unconstitutional and ordered the Prince
Edward public schools reopened. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232-34 (1964);
see also Jeffries, Jr. & Ryan, supra note 152, at 330; Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenes from the
Southside: A Desegregation Drama in Five Acts, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 327, 340-43
(1997).
159. See Jeffries, Jr. & Ryan, supra note 152, at 331.
160. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971); cf. Green
v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-42 & n.6 (1968) (holding a freedom-of-choice plan
unconstitutional, but not necessarily endorsing school busing in that instance).
161. Jeffries, Jr. & Ryan, supra note 152, at 331.
162. Id. at 332.
163. Id. at 334.
164. Id.
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It was thus unsurprising when the NAACP called on the black
community to oppose school aid. As one prominent minister
observed, religious schools were about to "succeed in carrying out
a de facto form of racial segregation with federal funds.""16
Recognizing that threat, the New York NAACP's president an-
nounced in 1967, "[w]e are against aid in any way, shape or form,
because it only helps those who would skirt legislation on desegrega-
tion. 166 In 1970, the Pennsylvania NAACP succeeded in bringing
Lemon v. Kurtzman 17 before the Supreme Court, a case that would
set the standard for impermissible school aid and become one of the
most important Establishment Clause rulings in American history.
1. Religious School Aid and the Desegregation Battle: Lemon v.
Kurtzman
Alton Lemon was an African-American man whose children
attended public school in Pennsylvania.16 In conjunction with the
NAACP, he brought a two-fold challenge against recently enacted
legislation that used taxes to subsidize the cost of teacher's salaries,
textbooks, and teaching materials in private schools." 9 First, Lemon
alleged that the effect of the Nonpublic Schools Act would be "to
encourage, promulgate and perpetuate de facto segregation, to the
detriment of the education received by his and other black children
in the public schools."17 As a result, Lemon claimed, the funding
scheme violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, Lemon asserted that because ninety-seven
percent of the private schools eligible for aid were religiously
affiliated, the Act constituted an establishment of religion and was
impermissible under the First Amendment.
171
Lemon's opponents did not challenge his assertion that the Act
would perpetuate segregation. Instead, they argued that Lemon
lacked standing to bring an equal protection claim because his
165. Berg, supra note 155, at 158-59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
168. See id. at 611; Brief for Appellants at 48, Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (No. 89).
169. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611.
170. Brief for Appellants, supra note 168, at 14.
171. Id. at 10.
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children had not been denied admission to any of the nonpublic
schools that were positioned to benefit from the Act.' 2 In fact,
Lemon had not sought to enroll his children in any of these schools.
Kurtzman's brief was devoted almost entirely to Lemon's First
Amendment challenge.
7 3
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lemon on the basis of his
Establishment Clause challenge.1 4 In doing so, the Court identified
a three-pronged test for permissible statutory law under the
Establishment Clause: the statute must have a secular purpose, its
primary effect must not be the advancement or inhibition of
religion, and it must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion. 75 Pennsylvania's Nonpublic School Act violated the
entanglement prong of this test. 76 Although Lemon and the NAACP
both dedicated significant portions of their briefs to the issue of
segregation, the Court addressed their equal protection challenge
only in a footnote, stating that the Establishment Clause ruling in
the case "makes it unnecessary for us to reach this issue.,'1 7 Still, it
is unlikely that the racial implications of the ruling went unnoticed
by the Court.
17
The interest of the NAACP and African Americans in opposing
aid to private schools, which enabled whites to avoid desegregation,
is obvious. It is less clear that school aid in itself undermined the
black community. Lemon and the NAACP both argued vehemently
that the provision of public money to religious schools involved
impermissible aid to religion under the First Amendment. 179
Although the non-Catholic, church-related schools at that time were
"virtually 100 percent white,"'8 ° the Catholic parochial school sys-
tem served ten thousand black students in the city of Philadelphia
alone.' "' A significant number of black families thus stood to benefit
172. See Brief for Appellees Kurtzman and Sloan at 10, Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (No. 89).
173. Id. at 12-37.
174. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
175. Id. At 612-13.
176. Id. at 613-14.
177. Id. at 611 n.5.
178. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J.
43, 62 (1997) ("[E]very Justice [in Lemon] took note of the issue, and it is hard to believe that
no Justice was influenced by it.").
179. Brief for Appellants, supra note 168, at 10.
180. Id. at 49.
181. See id. at 50.
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from the Nonpublic School Act. As Lemon emphasized, however, the
vast majority of black children in the parochial school system
attended schools that were over eighty-five percent black.182 The
overarching issue for Lemon and the NAACP was racial segregation.
Lemon observed that, "[t]o its great credit the Philadelphia
Archdiocese supports and maintains fifteen black ghetto schools for
black children ... but this is not integration."' 18 3 There is no evidence
that Lemon or the NAACP had any vested interest in the Establish-
ment Clause challenge other than its potential usefulness in
obtaining the desired outcome in the case.
2. Shifting Tides in the Black Community: Aguilar v. Felton
The tension between racial segregation and public funding of
religious schools has continued since Lemon. As the battle for school
desegregation wore on during the 1970s, so did the Supreme Court's
attack on religious school aid. By 1980, the Court had struck down
tuition reimbursement for low-income children,1" maintenance
and repair assistance for schools serving low-income families, l8 5
reimbursement for standardized testing expenses,' provision of
school services and education equipment,8 7 and funding for
instructional materials and field trips." In 1985, the Court hit the
high water mark of its "No Aid" position'89 with back-to-back rulings
in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball s° and Aguilar v. Felton.'9'
We focus on Aquilar here.
Aguilar involved a challenge to a publicly funded program that
provided remedial assistance to low-income children with educa-
tional need, regardless of whether they attended public or private
school.'92 One result of this program was that public school teachers
182. Id.
183. Id. at 50 (ellipsis in original).
184. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973).
185. Id. at 774-80.
186. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-82 (1973).
187. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975).
188. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-55 (1977); see Jeffries, Jr. & Ryan, supra note
152, at 288-89 (summarizing the Court's school aid decisions between 1947 and 1996).
189. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., REIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 495 (2002).
190. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
191. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
192. Id. at 406.
2007] 1367
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
were providing services to children on the premises of religiously
affiliated schools.19 Although neither the parties' briefs nor the
Court's opinion reference the issue of segregation,"9 Aguilar marks
an important turning point in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
for African Americans: it is the first time that a significant contin-
gent of the black community had reason to support public aid to
religious schools. This schism continued to grow in the late 1980s
and 1990s, as black families grew frustrated with the dismal quality
of urban public schools and wanted other options for their
children.195 Indeed, there is solid evidence that black students at
parochial schools perform significantly better than their public
school counterparts and are much more likely to graduate from high
school and attend college.1 Programs that provide publicly funded
vouchers for religious schools began to receive substantial support
from the black community; in a 1997 poll, seventy-two percent of
black parents favored voucher programs.
19 7
3. Shifting Tides in the Supreme Court: Agostini v. Felton
As the landscape of religious school aid and its implications
for African Americans changed, so did the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Beginning in the mid-1980s,
the Court shifted its position on public aid to religious institutions,
requiring only that the government "be neutral in its allocation of
funds" rather than "support only secular activities." ' After five
Justices suggested in a 1994 opinion that it might be time to
overrule Aguilar,1 fifteen parochial school parents, mostly single
193. Id.
194. The appellant's brief repeatedly emphasizes that the remedial assistance program was
designed to "bring better education to millions of disadvantaged youth who need it most,"
Brief for Appellants at 3, Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402 (No. 84-237) (quoting S. REP. No. 89-146, at
5 (1965)), and that many of the parochial schools served by the program were "located in
inner-city neighborhoods with large minority populations." Id. at 11 n.16.
195. See Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment,
and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 303-10 (2000).
196. Id.
197. Jeffries, Jr. & Ryan, supra note 152, at 361.
198. MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 189, at 503.
199. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717-18 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id.
at 731-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and Thomas, J.).
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working mothers, brought New York's remedial education program
before the Court in Agostini v. Felton. °° Only one of the briefs in the
case mentioned the issue of racial segregation and, interestingly, it
did so in support of the school aid program. The amicus brief argued
that publicly funded remedial education in religious schools
increased the choices open to low-income parents, and cited evidence
that school choice was "being used to combat racial segregation" and
had "become the preferred approach to desegregation in districts
throughout the country."2 °1 The parochial school parents did not
make race an issue in their argument, but did emphasize that all
the children who benefited from the program were "economically
and educationally disadvantaged" and that the government's intent
was only to "improve the lot" of such children.2"2 For many people,
the litigation symbolized a battle between poor, working parents
who merely wanted quality education for their children, and white
elites whose opposition to school aid was purely philosophical. To no
one's surprise, the Court sided with the parents, overruling both its
assumption in Aguilar that teachers on religious school premises
were likely to teach religion and its conclusion in Grand Rapids that
any educational aid to religious schools necessarily creates an
impermissible "symbolic union" between church and state.20 3
Not all African Americans agreed with the parents in Agostini. As
the Supreme Court continued to relax its stand on religious aid in
the 1990s and early 2000s, the issue of religious school vouchers
became increasingly controversial in the black community. Black
school-choice proponents formed an unlikely alliance with conserva-
tive white evangelicals, arguing that publicly funded tuition
assistance for religious schools would provide low-income families
with a desperately needed alternative to failing urban public
schools.2 °4 Other African Americans argued that religious school aid
would only benefit a small minority of poor black students and
200. 521 U.S. 203 (1997); see Martin Kasindorf, Aid to Parochial Pupils: Court To Review
1985 Ruling that Led to Complex Situation, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at A3.
201. Brief of Institute for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12
n.4, Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (Nos. 96-552, 96-553).
202. Brief for Petitioners Rachel Agostini, et al. at 26, Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos.
96-552, 96-553).
203. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 220, 235.
204. See Jodi Wilgoren, Young Blacks Turn to School Vouchers as Civil Rights Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at Al.
20071 1369
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that the majority would be left behind in rapidly deteriorating
public schools that lacked the money necessary to improve their
performance."' In 2002, this tension surfaced with force in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris.°6
4. The Voucher Battle: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
Zelman involved a taxpayer challenge to the Ohio Pilot
Scholarship Program, which provided private school tuition aid for
certain low-income children in the Cleveland City School District. °7
The taxpayers argued that because ninety-six percent of the
participating students attended religiously affiliated schools, the
program had the impermissible effect of advancing religion.
208
The respondents, not surprisingly, denied the First Amendment
charge, but they also introduced a novel argument into the school
aid debate: even if the voucher program did advance religion, it
should be upheld on the ground that "the improvement it will
bring to the education of African-American students now attend-
ing Cleveland's public schools outweighs Establishment Clause
concerns."209 This claim was supported in an amicus brief by a
newly formed provoucher organization entitled the Black Alliance
for Educational Options (BAEO). In its brief, BAEO described
itself as a nonprofit, intergenerational organization "committed to
improving the educational opportunities available to minority and
low-income children., 210 Although the summary of argument stated
that the "case [was] not about religion, but about educational
policy,"2 '1 most of the brief addressed the Establishment Clause
issue. BAEO argued that the voucher program did not have the
primary effect of advancing religion and that it was administered in
205. Id.
206. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
207. See id. at 643-47 (describing the Ohio program).
208. Brief for Respondents Doris Simmons-Harris, et al. at 2, 6-7, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639
(Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
209. Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. and the NAACP as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779)
[hereinafter NAACP Brief].
210. Brief of Black Alliance for Educational Options as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 2, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
211. Id.
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a religiously neutral fashion.212 Only at the end of the brief did
BAEO return to the issue of educational opportunity, citing
numerous studies about the success of vouchers in failing school
systems. They concluded that invalidating the Cleveland program
"would force thousands of economically disadvantaged children to
return to the substandard conditions of Cleveland's inner-city public
schools. 213
The NAACP disagreed. In an amicus brief supporting the
taxpayers, the NAACP argued that the tuition assistance program
raised "grave dangers of ... fostering the resegregation of schooling
in Cleveland." '214 As evidence, they pointed out that whites were
participating in the voucher program at a disproportionate rate
compared to the number of white students in the school district.2 5
The brief made no argument with regard to the Establishment
Clause challenge, concluding only that the "Court should act to
prevent the establishment of separate private, predominantly white
educational systems and public, predominantly minority educa-
tional systems ... by rejecting" the petitioner's argument.2 6
Zelman sparked intense conflict in the black community about
the desirability of school choice. Although the Establishment Clause
was the legal basis for the litigation, the surrounding debate had
nothing to do with religion or church-state relations. Nonetheless,
as in Lemon,217 the Supreme Court completely ignored the race-
and class-based implications of Cleveland's tuition assistance
program, and instead grounded its decision exclusively on the First
Amendment. In a 5-4 ruling, the Justices held that the program was
"entirely neutral with respect to religion" and did not offend the
Establishment Clause.218
212. Id. at 3-4.
213. Id. at 29.
214. NAACP Brief, supra note 209, at 2.
215. Id. at 13.
216. Id. at 17.
217. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
218. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002).
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5. The Continuing School Aid Debate in the Black Community
As one writer observed, "[s]trange days indeed, when the
NAACP's ... opponents are black school children singing 'We Shall
Overcome' on the courthouse steps." ' Tuition assistance for
nonpublic schools has become increasingly popular in cities
throughout the country, and the black community remains divided
about the impact of such programs. In reflecting on the history of
religious school aid rulings in the context of the African-American
community, the most interesting observation is that the actual issue
of religious establishment has been entirely ancillary to that of
racial segregation and educational opportunity. Although shifts in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence have, for the most part,
paralleled shifts in the impact of religious school aid on black
schoolchildren, the Supreme Court has never acknowledged the
racial consequences of its school aid rulings. As a result, a severe
disconnect exists between the internal logic of the Court's opinions
and external influences and implications of the litigation leading to
those opinions. Zelman raised an important question: can benefits
for a historically disadvantaged population outweigh religious
establishment concerns in determining the constitutional validity
of a school aid program? By focusing the Zelman opinion exclusively
on the Establishment Clause challenge, the Court left this question
unanswered.
B. Faith-based Social Services
The use of public money to fund private social services has a long
history in the United States; as early as 1898, New York City
distributed fifty-seven percent of its money for relief of the poor to
private agencies.22 ° Throughout this history, churches and religious
organizations have been at the forefront in providing social services,
with "religiously motivated persons [typically] ... the first into
areas of societal need." '221 As government contracting with nonprofit
agencies increased dramatically over the past forty years, so did the
219. Garnett & Garnett, supra note 195, at 305-06.
220. STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 6 (1996).
221. Id. at 8.
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amount of public money going to churches and religious organiza-
tions. Each year, billions of tax dollars are funneled through
religiously affiliated programs for the provision of health care, foster
care, drug and mental health treatment, job training, child care, and
a host of other social services.22 The New York Roman Catholic
archdiocese alone receives $1.75 billion annually in government
funds.22 3 Although some of these services are provided in a secular
manner, many of the churches and religious nonprofits that receive
public funds continue to incorporate religious doctrine and faith-
based practices into their services. A recent study by Stephen
Monsma found that among religiously based child service agencies,
seventy-one percent have religious symbols or pictures in their
facilities; sixty-four percent have spoken prayers at meals; seventy
percent have "informal references to religious ideas by staff
with clients"; thirty-five percent have required religious activities;
and thirty-three percent "encourage religious commitments" by
clients.224 As Monsma observes, "[o]ne of the best kept-secrets in the
United States is that when it comes to public money and religious
nonprofit organizations, sacred and secular mix." '225
1. The Constitutionality of Faith-based Social Services: Bowen
v. Kendrick
Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence includes only one
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of providing public
funds for social services by religious entities. Decided in 1988,
Bowen v. Kendrick.26 involved a challenge to the Adolescent Family
Life Act, which bestowed federal grants to public and private
organizations for the purpose of providing services related to
teenage sexual activity and pregnancy. 7 Because religious
organizations were included among grantees, the plaintiffs argued
that the Act constituted an impermissible establishment of
222. See id. at 1, 7.
223. Id. at 10.
224. Id. at 75 tbl.7.
225. Id. at 1.
226. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
227. Id. at 593.
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religion.22 The Supreme Court rejected this challenge, holding that
"direct government aid to religiously affiliated institutions does not
have the primary effect of advancing religion." '229 Although the
plaintiffs also argued that the program created "an unacceptable
risk" that the grant money would be used to promote religion, the
majority disagreed, stating "we refus[e] to presume that [the grant]
would be used in a way that would have the primary effect of
advancing religion."23
Although Bowen specifically stated that social service providers
may only use public money for secular purposes, its rejection of the
plaintiffs' "unacceptable risk" argument had the practical effect of
making it extremely difficult to win broad-based Establishment
Clause challenges to government grant programs. Instead, a
plaintiff must litigate on a grant-by-grant basis and show that
specific grant recipients are using public money to promote
religion.2"' This aspect of Bowen explains why there has been so
little litigation regarding religious activity by government-funded
social service providers: it is simply not worth the effort for the
ACLU or other separation watchdogs to litigate against specific
grants to specific religious organizations. The most important
exception to this nonlitigation pattern is Wilder v. Bernstein,"2 a
faith-based social service case decided by the Second Circuit in 1988.
2. Faith-based Social Services and Disparate Racial Impact:
Wilder v. Bernstein
Wilder was the culmination of a series of lawsuits challenging the
New York City Department of Social Service's pervasive use of
sectarian foster care agencies and its practice of placing children in
agencies affiliated with the same religious denomination as the
child's legal parent(s).233 Represented by the New York Civil
Liberties Union, Shirley Wilder, a black, Protestant foster child,
complained that the provision of state funds to sectarian agencies
228. Id. at 597.
229. Id. at 609.
230. Id. at 612 (citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760 (1976)).
231. See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 189, at 600.
232. 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988).
233. Id. at 1341.
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and the department's religious-matching scheme violated the
Establishment, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution.234
With regard to the establishment claim, Wilder argued that the
Department's practice of providing public funds to sectarian
agencies impermissibly advanced religion and favored some
religions over others and over nonreligion.235 Although the free
exercise claim is outside the scope of this article, the equal protec-
tion claim is interesting because, like Lemon in his challenge to
parochial school aid, Wilder argued that the church-state partner-
ship at issue resulted in discrimination against blacks and other
minorities.236 In New York City, the best foster care facilities were
overwhelmingly Jewish and Catholic-run. Because the statutory
scheme gave Jewish and Catholic children first rights to placement
with these agencies, Protestant children were, on the basis of their
religion, sent to inferior Protestant, secular, or public facilities.
Wilder asserted that these placements were racially discriminatory
because white children were more likely to be Catholic and Jewish,
and black children were more likely to be Protestant.23 v As a result,
"black children waited longer than white children for placement;
and black children were more often and in numbers disproportion-
ate to white children placed with agencies of inferior quality.238
The first district court to consider Wilder's claims conceded that
the department's practices did violate "the literal language of
the Establishment Clause," but held that this infringement was
justified by two legitimate state interests: the right of legal parents
to determine the religious upbringing of their children, and the right
of foster children to free exercise of religion.2 39 The three-judge court
concluded that the statutes and practices at issue represented "a
fair and reasonable accommodation between the Establishment and
234. See id. at 1338, 1341.
235. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
236. See id. at 1301-02.
237. Id. at 1302.
238. Martin Guggenheim, State-supported Foster Care: The Interplay Between the
Prohibition of Establishing Religion and the Free Exercise Rights of Parents and Children:
Wilder v. Bernstein, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 603, 621 (1990).
239. Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1024-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see Guggenheim,
supra note 238, at 615-16.
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Free Exercise Clauses" of the First Amendment.140 When a new
complaint was filed five years later, essentially continuing the
original lawsuit,241 the new district court judge came to the same
conclusion, balancing Establishment Clause concerns with "other
equally important provisions of the Constitution. 242
As in the school-aid cases, the racial discrimination charges fell
by the wayside. In the first round of litigation, the district court
explicitly limited its inquiry to the Establishment Clause challenge,
declining to consider Wilder's equal protection claim.243 Eventually,
the parties entered into a settlement agreement that required the
Department of Human Services to ensure that black Protestant
children had equal access to the best facilities by implementing a
"first-come, first-served" policy when demand for a particular
placement exceeded availability.244 The last round of Wilder liti-
gation was instigated by sectarian agencies that objected to the
settlement and argued, among other things, that the "first-come,
first-served" policy was a race-conscious remedy without empirical
justification.24' The district court and Second Circuit both rejected
this argument, not because they found sufficient evidence to justify
a race-conscious remedy, but because they concluded that the "first-
come, first-served" policy was not race conscious. 24' Thus, at no point
in the entire litigation did any of the courts consider whether New
York City's practice of matching religion in foster care placements
actually violated the equal protection rights of black children. The
cases were decided entirely on the basis of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses. As in the school-aid cases, the judiciary acted
as if the only issue presented was one of church and state and
ignored the racial undertones and implications of the litigation.
240. Wilder, 385 F. Supp. at 1029.
241. See Guggenheim, supra note 238, at 621.
242. See Wilder, 385 F. Supp. at 1024.
243. Id. at 1017-18.
244. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1343-45 (2d Cir. 1988).
245. Id. at 1340-41.
246. Id. at 1345; Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1320-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE PRAYER VIGIL AND THE CONSTITUTION
The preceding review of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
makes clear that the African-American struggle for civil rights has
intersected in important ways with the Court's development of ideas
regarding the separation of church and state. The review also
highlights the extent to which African Americans, or at least key
African-American political institutions, have conceptualized the
community's interests in the Establishment Clause. For the most
part, the litigation pattern suggests that the African-American
community's interest in the Establishment Clause has been
instrumental-a legal vehicle used to achieve a higher end such as
desegregation. And desegregation, while clearly pursued for its own
moral value, also had instrumental value to those litigating cases
like Lemon. African Americans hoped that their children would have
access to high quality education through desegregation. One can
easily see this last point by looking to more recent cases such as
Zelman: there, Establishment Clause concerns, at least for some
African-American litigants, took a back seat to an interest in
educational quality, which the litigants hoped to achieve through a
more liberal voucher policy. Note that even the NAACP, which
supported the claim that Ohio's program violated the Establishment
Clause, did not press a First Amendment argument. The NAACP
opposed the voucher plan out of concern that the program would
reestablish segregated public schools.247
There is little concern about, or even attention to, the potential
dangers that outsiders see regarding close church-state relation-
ships exhibited by representative African-American institutions;
perhaps this is not surprising, particularly in light of the centrality
of church-like norms, religious language, and other social practices
readily flowing from the towering institutions of African-American
cultural life. Indeed the central role of churches in African-American
communities helps explain not only Commander Ervin's success in
facilitating the WSC prayer vigils, but also the seemingly inconsis-
tent litigation positions of the NAACP in Lemon on the one hand,
and the BAEO and NAACP in Zelman on the other. In no case did
the kinds of "traditional" Establishment Clause concerns identified
247. NAACP Brief, supra note 209, at 2.
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by the Everson Court ever loom larger for these groups. Given that
one might argue that the groups of people most affected by a
particular policy-African-American public school students in Ohio,
residents of high crime neighborhoods in Chicago-are less troubled
by potential constitutional problems than less impacted outsiders,
should one conclude that certain collaborations between the state
and the church, like the WSC prayer vigil, should be sanctioned?
248
It would be ironic, to say the least, to conclude that activities such
as the WSC prayer vigil should be prohibited given that the
community-based problems to be remedied on Chicago's West Side
have a particular history. That history is one of political exclusion
and marginalization-marginalization that made it difficult for
community members of the past to acquire the resources necessary
to avert the kinds of processes that Shaw and McKay argued led
to crime.249 In that atmosphere, African-American residents of
urban disadvantaged neighborhoods created their own civil
institutions-the church being one-to deal with community-based
problems. It is natural, then, that residents would turn to this
venerable institution when taking the beginning steps to reestab-
lish, or establish for the first time, working relationships with
political and government actors. And it would be sad-perhaps even
an outrage-to use the Constitution to prevent residents of impover-
ished communities from drawing on this longstanding source of civic
strength and power.
In their brief, the Zelman litigants offered a framework for
situating the WSC prayer vigil in its proper historical context. They
proposed a balancing test, arguing that even if Cleveland's voucher
program violated the Establishment Clause on its face, it should be
upheld on the ground that "the improvement it will bring to the
education of African-American students ... outweighs Establishment
Clause concerns."25 This approach is attractive because it breaks
down the, somewhat artificial, lack of balancing in the First
Amendment religion cases. The most problematic element of the
248. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City,
32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805, 830-32 (1998) (arguing that it is important that courts, when
considering the constitutionality of crime policy, consider the views of those most affected by
the policy and accord this group more weight than the views of outsiders).
249. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
250. NAACP Brief, supra note 209, at 3.
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current Lemon test is that, at least facially, it is a purely formal
inquiry: whether or not a state action constitutes religious establish-
ment has nothing to do with the context in which the action takes
place. Although the historical development of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence strongly suggests that the Justices are swayed by the
circumstances surrounding the challenged activity, the Court's
reasoning is always expressed as if it takes place in a vacuum,
inconsiderate of the extrareligious impact of its decisions. This
tendency could be precisely why it is so difficult to identify an
internal logic in the Court's opinions; the Justices fail to articulate
the true scope of the Lemon inquiry, which necessarily involves
some balancing of competing state interests. Constitutional
balancing outside of the Establishment Clause context is wide-
spread. The Court has acknowledged the role of interest-weighing
in almost every other area of constitutional law, including freedom
of speech,251 substantive due process,252 procedural due process,25 3
equal protection,254 separation of powers,255 privileges and immuni-
ties,25 dormant federal commerce power,257 and even free religious
exercise."' Why not here? The balancing approach to religious
establishment eliminates the need for artificial formalistic debate
over church-state interactions and provides a platform for examin-
ing the empirical questions that currently divide the black commu-
nity: Does parochial school aid hurt disadvantaged students? Is the
provision of federally funded social services by black churches
good for black communities? Can church-police partnerships
improve the safety of poverty-stricken neighborhoods? Under
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, these inquiries appear
irrelevant. In reality, they are often the heart of the matter.
In fact, one way to look at the litigation path described above is
to say that African-American litigants in establishment cases have
implicitly made a balancing argument since Lemon. While it could
251. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939).
252. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 853 (1992).
253. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
254. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-98 (1976).
255. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1986).
256. See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985).
257. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320-21 (1851).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
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be coincidental that establishment jurisprudence has, in so many
ways, paralleled the interests of African Americans, it appears
that the Supreme Court has not been immune to the racial implica-
tions of its establishment decisions. The problem here is that the
explicit identification of race as a factor under the Lemon test
could constitute impermissible racial discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause. This might explain the Court's reluctance
to recognize the racial implications of its decisions-allowing
Cleveland's voucher program to continue solely on the basis of its
benefit to black children would put the Court on very dangerous
ground.259 It is certainly permissible, however, for the state to
undertake efforts to improve the quality of life in poverty-stricken
neighborhoods; as the Court held in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, wealth is not a suspect classification.2"
A church-state partnership in a poor, black neighborhood might be
justified not because the community is black, but because the
centrality of the church in that community creates a situation in
which the most efficient and effective way for the government to
serve that community is through its religious institutions. The
Equal Protection Clause impacts the ways in which black litigants
can frame their contextual arguments, but it does not prevent courts
from considering the unique role of faith-based institutions in black
communities. Moreover, even in cases bringing race-based Equal
Protection challenges, courts have been willing to give special
leeway to police and public safety arguments.261
259. If it is true that the Court has not been immune to the racial implications of its
decisions in the Establishment Clause cases, even without mentioning race, then it would not
be the first time in the Court's history. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156-58 (1998) (noting that nearly all the
landmark criminal procedure cases arose in a context in which the Supreme Court fashioned
its decisions in response to institutionalized racism without being very forthcoming about this
fact, and drawing a comparison to modern free speech jurisprudence).
260. 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
261. See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the
City's testing program allowing African-American police officers to be promoted before whites
with better raw test scores because the city had a "compelling state interest" in a racially
balanced police force and because the program was "narrowly tailored" to the problem). The
Court went on to explain that it has left open small windows for discrimination when the
discrimination is supported by compelling public safety issues, such as police department
effectiveness. Id. at 1114 (citing Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir.
2002)); see Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1981) (allowing race-based
promotion of police officers).
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EPILOGUE: THE CAUTIONARY TALE OF KIRYAS JOEL
While the doctrine erected around the First Amendment's religion
clauses is the antithesis of clarity, the basic purposes of those
clauses are fairly straightforward. Thus, courts have worried about
government's excessive interference with or promotion of religion to
ensure that no individual is forced by the State to undertake a
religious practice that he or she does not want to, or forced to
believe in a deity at all, thereby assuring the "fullest possible scope
of religious liberty and tolerance."" 2 This idea has led to judicial
tests to seek out coercion and endorsement."3 In the context of the
WSC prayer vigils, the concerns of those tests may be at worst
misplaced or, at best, unhelpful, because of the cultural norms and
practices of the relevant neighborhood residents. But the First
Amendment religion clauses have an additional goal that is relevant
to the events in WSC, and, indeed relevant to the social process
promoted here. Specifically, another goal of the religion clauses is
to "avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social
conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike."2''
Social processes in WSC were not activated in ways that brought
the greatest potential for crime reduction and prevention; in part,
this was due to conflict among the community's important institu-
tions that was based, at least in part, on religion. Justice Breyer's
presumed strategy of greater secularization to quiet the conflict is
unlikely to succeed in WSC, however, where church culture is so
prominent. Instead, a different route, one that simultaneously
promotes a religious approach to interaction with community
leaders and an approach of official state-based neutrality, appears
to be the correct prescription-a prescription in many ways in
accord with the goal underlying the religion clauses themselves.
262. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
263. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992) (advocating a coercion test); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 n.1 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating an
endorsement test).
264. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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Vigilance is still in order, however. The very success of the prayer
vigils and the ensuing accretion of the WSC ministers in municipal
government may lead to concern for the relative power of other
religious groups in WSC. As long as all religious groups have equal
access to municipal resources, there is little reason to worry; but to
the extent of evidence that one sect is favored over another, or even
shut out altogether-is the Nation of Islam at the table?-one might
rightly wonder whether endorsement and coercion ought to play a
larger role in regulating the local activities in WSC. Where would
that regulation come from? This Article ends with a cautionary tale:
the story of Kiryas Joel.26
Kiryas Joel Village is a community of ultraorthodox Hasidic Jews
located fifty miles northwest of New York City. Following the
Holocaust, surviving members of the Satmar Hasidic sect relocated
from Europe to the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York.
2 66
By 1975, the Satmar community had grown too large for its forty-
square-block enclave in Brooklyn, and decided to purchase 320 acres
of land in Monroe, New York.26 7 A zoning dispute soon arose with
the township, leading the Satmars to incorporate their land as the
Village of Kiryas Joel in 1977.26 As of 1995 the village had over
twelve thousand residents, all of whom were members of the Satmar
Hasidic sect. Children made up about half the population.269
The Kiryas Joel community is devoutly religious and maintains
a lifestyle that bears little resemblance to that of mainstream
society. They interpret the Torah strictly and speak Yiddish as their
primary language. Men and women are segregated outside the home
and wear unconventional clothes that include head coverings and
special garments for boys and modest dresses for girls. Television,
radio, and English-language publications are prohibited. Children
are educated at private, sex-segregated religious schools, where boys
265. The details of the following story can be found in Board of Education V. Grumet,
(Kiryas Joel) 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
266. Id. at 690-91.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Deidre M. Glasser, Case Note, The Curious Case of Kiryas JoeL" Board of
Education v. Grumet (Kiryas Joel), 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994), 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1947, 1948 n.5
(1995); see also Lisa W. Foderaro, Hasidic Public School Loses Again Before U.S. Supreme
Court, but Supporters Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1999, at B5 (stating that the village
population was fifteen thousand in 1999).
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receive extensive training in the Talmud and girls are prepared for
their roles as wives and mothers.27°
While the two parochial schools in Kiryas Joel were intended to
serve the entire community, they did not have the resources
necessary to provide special education services to children with
disabilities. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
these children were entitled to adequate special education even
though they were enrolled in private schools. Thus, the challenge
facing New York State and the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District, in which the village was located, was how to provide special
education services to the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel." 1
The New York legislature determined that this situation consti-
tuted an educational crisis, and decided that special education
services should be offered within the community of Kiryas Joel.272
With the support of the Monroe-Woodbury school district and the
village, the state legislature enacted a special statute that estab-
lished Kiryas Joel as "a separate school district" that would "have
and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district
under the provisions of the education law." '273 The statute empow-
ered a locally elected school board to open and close schools, hire
teachers, prescribe textbooks, and establish disciplinary rules.
Governor Cuomo called the new law "a good faith effort to solve
thea unique problem" of educating the handicapped children of
Kiryas Joel. 4
Only one public school was opened by the new district, a special
education school that served about forty full-time students and 160
part-time students.275 Nonhandicapped children in Kiryas Joel
continued to attend parochial school and used the new school
district only for transportation, remedial education, and health and
welfare services.2 76 If a nonhandicapped child had requested public
education, the district would have paid tuition to send the child to
another school district nearby.27 7 Neighboring school districts made
270. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 691.
271. Id. at 692.
272. See id. at 693.
273. Id. at 693 n.1 (quoting 1989 N.Y. Laws, ch. 748).
274. Id. at 693 (alteration in original).
275. See id. at 694.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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arrangements to send their handicapped Hasidic children to the
Kiryas Joel public school; two-thirds of the full-time students were
from outside the village."' Despite the religious nature of the
village, the Kiryas Joel public school was wholly secular, with non-
Satmar teachers and staff, coeducation of boys and girls, and a
secular curriculum." 9 The superintendent hired to manage the
district, Dr. Steven Bernardo, was not a member of the Satmar
community."' Although some members of an ultraconservative
wing of the community felt the presence of the secular school
violated the Torah, most residents of the village were pleased with
the new arrangement, as were neighboring school districts and
state officials.2"'
Despite the satisfaction of the involved parties with the statute,
a number of taxpayers opposed the new school district. A lawsuit
was filed challenging the constitutionality of the statute that
created the Kiryas Joel Village School District.282 In 1994, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the statute did indeed involve impermissi-
ble entanglement of church and state and thus violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 3 In response, only
days later, the New York legislature passed a new statute, Chapter
241, that was intended to provide a religion-neutral mechanism for
reestablishing the Kiryas Joel school district.2' The new law
allowed all qualifying municipalities to "organize a new union free
school district consisting of the entire territory of such municipality
whenever the educational interests of the community require it." '285
A seceding district was required to have at least two thousand
children and surpass the state average in wealth, although its
secession could not adversely affect the larger district. In addition,
Chapter 241 only applied to cities, towns, and villages in existence
on an effective date.286 Kiryas Joel quickly applied to re-establish its
278. Id.
279. Id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280. See id.; Haran C. Rashes, Try, Try, Try Again: The Kiryas Joel Village School District
and the Separation of Shul, School, and State, 29 U. TOL. L. REv. 485, 494 (1998).
281. See Foderaro, supra note 269.
282. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 694 & n.2.
283. Id. at 709-10.
284. Grumet v. Cuomo, 625 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
285. Id.
286. Grumet v. Cuomo, 681 N.E.2d 340, 344 (N.Y. 1997).
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school district, and the Monroe-Woodbury Board of Education voted
unanimously to approve the secession.28 7 Thus, the Kiryas Joel
Village School District was reestablished within weeks of the
Supreme Court decision. But Chapter 241 was also challenged by
taxpayers, on the grounds that it singled out Kiryas Joel for special
treatment and thereby involved impermissible governmental
endorsement of the Satmar religious community. Indeed, Kiryas
Joel was the only municipality in New York that qualified for
secession under the new law. In 1997, the New York Court of
Appeals struck down Chapter 241 as unconstitutional.288
A few months later, the New York legislature tried again,
enacting Chapter 390, which still allowed Kiryas Joel Village to
create its own school district but under broader guidelines.
29
Governor Pataki estimated that ten municipalities qualified under
the new law.2 ° Opponents claimed the law applied to only two
towns and filed suit challenging its constitutionality. 29 1 Although
the school district won the first round of litigation, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed in 1999, concluding again that the law
violated the Establishment Clause because it involved special
treatment of a religious community.
29 2
This time, the New York legislature was prepared: two months
earlier, they had passed a fourth law that allowed the re-establish-
ment of the Kiryas Joel school district but expanded the criteria for
secession even further. The new statute was broad enough to cover
twenty-nine municipalities in New York.293 Kiryas Joel Village was
again approved as a separate school district, and although oppo-
nents threatened to sue for a fourth time, it does not appear that a
lawsuit was ever filed.
The Kiryas Joel Village School District exists today, operating one
special education school that employs twenty-four teachers and
serves 179 students. In 1999-2000, per pupil expenditure was
$74,048, almost seven times the average expenditure per pupil in
287. Id.
288. Id. at 342.
289. Grumet v. Pataki, 720 N.E.2d 66, 70 (N.Y. 1999).
290. Id. at 83 (Belacosa, J., dissenting).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 67 (majority opinion).
293. Foderaro, supra note 269.
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New York state public schools.294 Dr. Bernardo still serves as
superintendent and the school continues to be wholly secular in its
management and curriculum. Thus, despite fifteen years of liti-
gation and four different formal policies, special education services
are now provided to Kiryas Joel children in the same way originally
envisioned by the state legislature when it first undertook the issue
in 1985.
On the one hand, the story of Kiryas Joel can be seen as a success
story. The Kiryas Joel "problem" arose because a Supreme Court
ruling forced Monroe-Woodbury to close its special education site at
the parochial school in Kiryas Joel. Underlying these rulings was a
fundamental value judgment by the Supreme Court about what the
relationship between church and state should look like in a good
society. In this context, the Kiryas Joel statute can be seen as the
New York legislature's response; that is, the statute represents the
legislature's judgment about what constitutes an appropriate
relationship between a state government and a religious community
such as Kiryas Joel. While the legislature could not challenge the
decisions already made by the Court, it did have the ability to
enter uncharted legal territory in an attempt to preserve what-
ever flexibility it could in its dealings with religious groups. This
volleying is partly a struggle over power, but it is also driven by
judgments about the value of church-state relationships. The
taxpayers' decision to challenge the statute also represented a
judgment about the value of state cooperation and accommodation
of religious groups, namely a belief that the Kiryas Joel statute
represented an undesirable endorsement of a particular religion by
the government. The story has a successful ending because the
children received the services that they needed, and the challengers,
presumably, decided that the legislature's design providing for
those services met their requirements, or at least was not worth
complaining about.
The story of Kiryas Joel suggests that a successful outcome could
be reached should the events in WSC be subject to challenge; and
such a challenge might generate a productive volleying that could
294. See UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., STATE EDUC. DEP'T, THE NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL
REPORT CARD FOR KIRYAS JOEL VILLAGE SCHOOL IN KIRYAS JOEL VILLAGE UNION FREE
SCHOOL DISTRICT 1 (2002), available at http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/repcrd2002/overview/
441202020001.pdf.
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check some of the possible negative outcomes. But suppose there is
no litigation. No one has ever discussed bringing the City of Chicago
into court over the WSC prayer vigils. Is this a good thing? Perhaps
it is not. Without litigation, it is not clear what check exists to
ensure that unconstitutional excesses do not take place. The state
legislature of New York was tenacious in the face of multiple
taxpayer challenges, but there is no guarantee that Chicago's
municipal officials would exert such energy. Without legislative or
executive pushback against challengers, the volleying displayed in
Kiryas Joel is not generated, and there is no guarantee of a positive
outcome. In such a world, perhaps the absence of litigation is a good
thing for the West Side of Chicago.
